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Abstract
The central question of this analysis is how the proportional representation
electoral systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are linked to indigenous political
representation. I argue that the electoral system and its affect on party structures and
party development are part of the reason why indigenous people, who make up a great
part of the population in these three countries, are chronically under-represented in their
political systems. In these case studies, district and national level data from the two most
recent elections for the national legislatures was analyzed in terms of indigenous party
formation and success. The study concludes that the institutional factors that were
considered have a negative influence on indigenous representation in Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru, but could gain more explanatory power if viewed in connection with socialeconomic factors, such as indigenous cultural values and poverty.
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Proportional Representation Electoral Systems and Indigenous Representation:
Case Studies from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru
Introduction

Indigenous people have often been denied access to and participation in the
political processes that shape their countries' political environments. This problem seems
particularly prominent in Latin America, or more specifically in the Andean region,
which is home to the largest native populace on the continent. While different historical,
social, and cultural aspects may have contributed to this development, this analysis will
focus on institutional factors that may have fostered the lack of indigenous representation
in government institutions, such as the electoral system and its subsequent effects on
indigenous party structures and party development.
This study will be centered on the examination of three cases: Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru. These countries are all located in the Andes region, are home to significant
indigenous populations, and share a similar history. Yet, in terms of the formation of
indigenous movements and factions, as well as their success at gaining political
representation at the national level, these states have differed greatly. A central question
in this analysis is to explain this variance in terms of the electoral system.
The definition of ethnic identities in Latin America has traditionally been an
obstacle for scholars. Boundaries between indigenous and non-indigenous people are
often not clearly defined, as a large part of the population comes from a mixed
indigenous/non-indigenous origin (i.e. mestizos). Many indigenous also identify
themselves along socio-economic lines, for example as peasants (particularly in the
highland areas), which makes it more difficult to distinguish them from peasants of
another ethnic origin. In places where the term "indio" traditionally carries a negative
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connotation, as in Peru, a large number of natives refuse to identify themselves overall as
Indians. 1 It used to be possible to identify indigenous people by their residence, as most
of them lived in rural areas and followed a non-industrial mode of production. However,
the increasing urbanization of the Andean countries over the past few decades makes
such a definition less valid, as many natives have moved to the cities in pursuit of a better
life. While a great number of these urban dwellers may follow their native traditions to an
extent (i.e. observe holidays and hold festivities), many have assimilated to the urban
culture and do not consider themselves distinct from it (Harlowe 2004, Degregori 1999).
Considering the existence of such intermediate categories and blurred divisions between
ethnic identities, it becomes evident that a precise definition of indigenous people is
difficult to find. It seems that the definition used by the United Nations Sub Commission
on the Prevention ofDiscriminatfon and Protection of Minorities comes closest to
including all relevant factors, I will therefore apply it to my analysis:
"Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical continuity
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns,
social institutions, and legal systems."
(cited in Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2000. "A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia
and Columbia." Journal ofLatin American Studies 32(1): 208.)

The blanket term "indigenous" hides the divisions that exist within the native
populace, as there are many different languages, nationalities, and traditions (for example
Quechua, Aymara etc.) Yet it seems that the concept is useful when looking at the
complex question of the inclusion of aboriginal people in the political processes of a
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state, since these peoples share a pre-Colombian history, chronic under-representation in
government, and have continually been discriminated against by other ethnic groups.
I have chosen the national legislatures of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru as the
objects of this study, for a number of reasons. The legislature seems to provide the
greatest opportunity for diversity amongst its members, as it is usually made up of a
larger number of individuals than the executive or judicial branches. Therefore, this
should be the institution that could provide an entry point to the national political stage
for indigenous factions more so than the presidency or the highest national court.
Furthermore, while it may be argued that the legislature has little leverage in regimes
where the executive branch holds the lion's share of political power (such as Bolivia),
people still need an outlet for communicating their demands to the government, and the
legislature can provide that. Furthermore, changes have to start somewhere. A legislative
body generally has lawmaking powers, even if they are diminished. Representation in
such an institution could then, theoretically, provide the opportunity to initiate, approve,
or disprove changes in the content and applicability of a state's legislation. I therefore
argue that representation in the legislature of the three countries under examination here
is meaningful.2
The following three chapters will attempt to find if and how the proportional
representation electoral systems can affect indigenous representation in national
legislatures. Each chapter is devoted to one Andean country, and presents findings drawn
from the two most recent national elections (in the case of Peru also from the latest
regional election). The goal of this analysis is not to make policy recommendations, but
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to illustrate first and foremost that electoral rules need to be considered when attempting
to design a system that allows for the inclusion of formerly excluded sectors of society.

1 The term indio has indicated inferiority in Bolivia and Ecuador as well (and still does to a certain extent
today). However, only in the case of Peru have a great number of scholars claimed that the negative
connotation that is associated with the indigenous label is a significant factor in preventing Peruvian natives
from identifying themselves along ethnic lines (i.e. Smith 2004, Degregori 1999).
2 Representation, in institutional terms, is defined as the inclusion in legislative decision-making processes,
and the opportunity to have proportional input on content and applicability of legislation.
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CHAPTER 1: Mixed Electoral Systems and Indigenous Representation:
A Case Study of Bolivia
Introduction
In recent years, a number of political movements in Latin America that are based
on indigenous identity have evolved into organizations that are demanding political
representation, participation, and the granting of individual and collective indigenous
rights (Yashar 1998). While scholars such as Horowitz (1985), Huntington and
Dominguez (1975), and Ted Robert Gurr (1993) have claimed that ethnic politicization in
Latin America remains weak, over the past decade, significant native organizations and
parties have emerged at the local and national levels in a number of Andean countries.
For example, in the 2002 elections, combined Bolivian indigenous parties received 27
percent of the national vote, an impressive electoral success in a country where the native
population has been, in political terms, chronically under-represented. The presidential
elections revealed similar results: the indigenous candidate Evo Morales lost to the
winner Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada by only a small margin (Van Cott 2003a). These
outcomes may signify that the native population is finally becoming able to actively
participate in the political arena, and that this presence can help channel and respond to
indigenous needs within the system. By looking closer at the specific case of Bolivia,
where 60 to 70 percent of the total population are indigenous, one may notice that such a
conclusion may be premature.
Over the past few years, there have been intensified indigenous protests and
political violence in this Andean country. In 2000, indigenous movements like CSUTCB
(Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) initiated
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roadblocks of the main national highway between two of the most important cities of the
country, La Paz and Santa Cruz, demanding control over land reform and land rights.
Members of CIDOB (Confederaci6n Indigena de Bolivia) congregated in Santa Cruz in
the same year, to present their requests concerning land, education, health, housing and
natural resources to the government (Gustafson 2002). More importantly, in 2003,
indigenous protestors initiated roadblocks to publicly object to police authority that had
arrested one of the group's members. Matters escalated after a fierce battle between
protestors and police (almost 60 people were killed), and elected Bolivian president
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign (A Political Awakening 2004). These
are only a few examples of recent upheavals. While it would be easy to view these
actions as isolated instances, I argue that they have a greater implication for the current
state of Bolivia, and particularly Bolivian indigenous politics. What these events
demonstrate, overall, is that despite apparently better representation in national and local
politics, indigenous people do not seem to have sufficient channels within the political
system to communicate their interests. If we look merely at overall numbers of deputies
in national or municipal political institutions to measure representation, it would suggest
that Indians now have a greater influence on political decisions, and that this should
prevent them from seeking alternative methods of reaching their political goals. This
however, does not seem to be the case.
If political representation does not open and provide adequate channels for

indigenous people to communicate and advocate their interests, then it has failed to fulfill
its purpose. In the case of Bolivia, then, I hypothesize that the political representation of
the indigenous population is insufficient, since extra-systemic struggles continue 1•
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Furthermore, I argue that the mixed proportional representation/plurality (PR/plurality)
electoral system, including party structures and party development as well as the Law of
Popular Participation (Ley de Participaci6n Popular) have contributed to this lack of
adequate indigenous representation.
The dependent variable, political representation, can be defined in various ways.
Ideally, true electoral representation should reflect the proportion of minority and
majority shares of the population (Horowitz 2003). In this case, minority and majority
interests could be addressed in the legislature according to prevalence to the overall
population. I measure representation in terms of how many delegates of indigenous
factions are present in political institutions, particularly the national legislature.
Furthermore, I evaluate the quality of representation, in terms of relative constituency
size per legislator, and compare it across districts.
The electoral system is the main independent variable. Throughout this analysis, I
discuss the theoretical implications of district magnitude, the proportion of PR/plurality
votes, the way votes are translated into seats (the d'Hondt method which uses highest
averages and successive divisors to determine to which faction to allocate how many
seats); and then apply these ideas to the Bolivian case. District magnitude describes the
number ofrepresentatives that are elected from a multi-member district. Furthermore, the
party system (meaning the structure that defines the survival rate of parties and interparty dynamics), and the evolution of indigenous parties seem to have played an
important part in the development of Bolivia. I examine what implications this variable
could have on the present and future evolution of representation of indigenous interests in
the political arena through a discussion of the nature of indigenous parties, their historical
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development, and their goals. Finally, the Law of Popular Participation, enacted in 1994,
and its effects will be evaluated. This law changed the dynamics of government in
Bolivia drastically, allowing for municipal decentralization and therefore prompting for
the inclusion of rural areas into the political process. Since the majority of indigenous
persons populated these areas, it seems logical to suspect that this law may have fostered
their active involvement in the electoral process. It may also have contributed to the
further evolution of old indigenous-based movements, as well as the formation of new
ones. Indigenous parties in the Andes region have been able to succeed more in recent
elections than in any prior ones. In Bolivia's case, could the electoral and party systems
and the law of popular participation be inhibiting factors to the full unfolding of this
trend?
Debates in the Literature

The literature on the political representation of indigenous interests throughout
Latin America in general and in Bolivia in particular has focused on a variety of issues.
A great part of scholarly work has been concerned with parties and party systems, their
failure to fully institutionalize, and their seeming inability to represent a broad spectrum
of societal interests (Coppedge 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Van Cott 2003a). In
the past, parties in Bolivia were mainly vehicles used to secure and spread state patronage
(Gamarra and Malloy 1995). While these objectives are inherent to most party systems,
when they become the primary role of factions the function of constituency
representation and integration will obviously be diminished. In more recent times, the
spectrum of parties in Bolivia has been broadened to include formerly marginalized
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groups of society. This happened mainly due to the evolution of parties out of indigenous
social movement organizations (Van Cott 2003a).
Not much has been published containing country-specific studies of indigenous
party development and its role in promoting the representation of indigenous interests.
Andolina (1999), in his comparison of Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements,
is hopeful because Indians themselves are now becoming involved in their own
representation, meaning that they are gaining a broader understanding of formal politics.
If this trend continues, they may be able to promote their interests themselves within the

political system rather than having to rely on non-indigenous actors to do so. Different
native movement organizations, despite conflicting ideas, are learning to work together.
This then can increase their chance at political success. Indigenous parties today built
their platform on distinct ethnic identity, rather than on the basis of cultural assimilation
to non-indigenous people, as had been projected by Needler (1967). This may be an
indication that these parties are able to bring better representation of the heterogeneous
nature of the country to the political arena by not conforming to the former domination of
non-indigenous elites.
Van Cott (2002), through her case studies of six Latin American countries and
ethnic parties within each, finds that institutional change is necessary to allow for the
formation of ethnic factions. While Van Cott generally sees the ongoing process of
indigenous politicization through a positive lens, ascribing success to inter-systemic
changes and reforms such as the Law of Popular Participation and the constitutional
reform, there are scholars that view these as failures of such institutional mechanisms.
Yashar (1999) finds that the current state of indigenous movements reflects the weakness
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of the ongoing state-building and decentralization processes in Bolivia. When we assume
that the inclusion of indigenous peoples and the overall consolidation of democracy is
possible through government institutions alone, indigenous communities can be harmed.
Both scholars, then, argue that analysis of change in political institutions needs to be
supplemented with consideration ofreal-life effects of these reforms. In studying the
interplay between the two factors (institutional change and its impact on social and
economic realities), one should be able to gain a more complete understanding of
successes and challenges that are brought about by institutional modification.
The current scholarly debate then is centered on the perceived successes and
failures of institutional reform in the process of granting access to the political system to
indigenous, largely marginalized populations. Gustafson (2002) warns that one should
not overestimate the impact of what he calls "neo-liberal interculturalism." This should
not be understood as a phenomenon that will grant citizenship to indigenous peoples
unilaterally, but will in fact move national political opposition forces away from the
center of national politics and further legitimize national political parties that are
managed by urban elites. This rather negative assessment of reforms implemented in
Bolivia would in a way support the hypothesis examined in this analysis, since the
electoral system is part of institutional reform and is supposed to be an attempt at better
representing the heterogeneous interests of Bolivian society. Donoso (2000) spells out
more clearly that he does not consider the reforms as being successful in helping to
overcome the lack of open and tolerant interaction of society. He asserts that the
modifications of the electoral system and constitution merely helped the most visible part
of representation, namely the part concerned with the election of the representative; but
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did not improve the functioning of the representative system and the social effects of
economic policy.
The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) is an example of an institutional change
aimed at increasing indigenous participation and access to political resources. The LPP
was passed and implemented in 1994. It's ultimate goal is a representative democracy,
and to reduce poverty, particularly in the rural areas. Due to this law, political power was
decentralized from the national government to new municipal governments, providing
rural areas that had traditionally been excluded from the political process with access to
formal government. The establishment of organizaciones territoriales de base (OTB) was
intended to grant local actors influence over matters that concerned the population, such
as education, healthcare etc. They also formed so-called surveillance committees, who
directly influence municipal policy (Andersson 1999, Calderon and Laserna 2003). These
organizations, then, provided an entry point to the political arena at the local level,
therefore serving as a breeding ground for future politicians. Many indigenous
community organizations were included in the OTBs, providing them with a channel to
communicate interests and being able to be actively involved in any decisions made that
regarded their community. The local constituency directly elected municipal officials
(Van Cott 2003a). This made the government appear closer and be able to address the
specific needs of the local population, and at the same time made it easier to hold the
governing elites responsible for their policies. Scholars' evaluation of the success of this
decentralization project varies. In a series of works, Van Cott (2000a; 2000b; 2003a;
2003b) looks at this law as an effective means of organizing the indigenous at the local
level and later to extend their influence to the national level. The effects of
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decentralization were discussed in terms of affecting the diversity of representatives at
the local, and to a certain extent, at the national level, since giving municipalities more
political power seems to foster the development of regional parties, that may grow to
compete at the national level. However, Andersson (1999) finds that this law promotes
the manifestation of old elites as new rulers, failing to reconstruct power roles in a way
beneficial to the indigenous. Calderon and Laserna (2003) note that the law helps create
new organizational structures at the expense of traditional popular organizations, such as
syndicates and civil committees, which were respected and preferred by many indigenous
people.
Other factors relevant to representation that are discussed in the literature include
Van Cott's (2000) notion that cultural boundaries and racial discrimination prevented the
indigenous population from entering the class of the ruling elites. Furthermore, the basic
rejection of the concept of political representation by many indigenous cultures further
complicates the task of working within the system. Indigenous people often times prefer
direct political participation that is based on the model of the Andean communities, or
ayllus (Van Cott 2000, 157).
Mixed electoral systems have become an increasingly interesting object of study
for political scientists. At least 29 countries have adopted this type of electoral system by
now (Massicotte and Blais 1999). There is a current debate over the categorization of
mixed systems. Some argue that dependent (compensatory) and independent (two
formulas are used independent of one another) systems should be separately classified as
PR and semi-proportional, respectively (Reynolds and Reilly 1997). Others argue that
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both types (dependent and independent) belong to the same broad category of mixed
systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999).
The effect of mixed systems on electoral motivation as well as legislative
behavior has been studied by various authors (Haspel, Remington and Smith 1998; Moser
1999). It is argued that strategic voting occurs under mixed systems, where plurality
votes are allocated to larger parties if electoral rules are designed to benefit larger parties
(Bawn 1993; 1999; Cox 1997; Reed 1999).

A debate also exists about the utility of the

study of electoral systems. Some scholars see mixed electoral systems as a controlled
environment for separate studies of each of its components (Moser 1995, 1999; Reed
1999). However, other political scientists are more concerned with interaction effects
between the two formulas, and do not agree that PR and plurality can be studied
separately when they occur in the same election as part of the same system (Cox and
Schoppa 2002).
While a number of single-country studies have been conducted looking at the
change of the electoral system to a mixed system and its effects on party system
development, little research that has been done on the specific effect of the electoral
system on indigenous representation (Birch 2000; D 'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997;
Ishiyama and Kennedy 2000; Katz 1996; Mckean and Scheiner 2000). Mainwaring and
Scully ( 1995) acknowledge the importance of electoral laws in influencing the
configuration of party competition. Van Cott (2003a) looks at different components of an
electoral system such as the electoral rule, representation threshold, district magnitude,
ballot access, decentralization and special reserved minority seats in her analysis of
ethnic parties in Latin America. She finds that the greater district magnitude, the more
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favorable it is to the formation of new parties. Coppedge (1997), on the other hand, in his
examination of 62 Latin American elections between 1914 and 1995, finds that changes
in district magnitude are rarely large enough to make a real difference. Overall, the
literature seems seems to be split into two camps; Those who find that the political
situation in Bolivia is favorable to the evolution and inclusion of indigenous parties, and
therefore helps the representation of indigenous peoples (Van Cott 2000b; Andolina
1999), and those that find that, despite political reforms, indigenous people are still
disadvantaged (Calderon and Laserna 2003; Donoso 2000; Gustafson 2002). I hope to
add to the latter literature in showing how indigenous representation is affected by the
electoral system.
Data and Methodology
I focus my analysis of the electoral system on the legislative branch of
government in Bolivia, more specifically on the lower chamber (Camera de los
Diputados). In analyzing the question of representation, I argue that since this part of the
Congress is made up of more individuals than the upper house (130 versus 27 seats,
respectively), it could provide more diversity, and therefore representation of multiple
interests. The lower house is also the institution that is elected by the mixed electoral
system under investigation here (mixed PR/plurality).
In order to assess the dynamics of the electoral system and their influence on
representation, I examine the outcome of the 2002 elections. Since indigenous parties
won a significant amount of votes (27 percent combined) for the first time, and I am
evaluating indigenous representation, it seems that this data would be the most
appropriate for the purpose of this study. Rather than just assessing aggregate, national
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level data, I compare district level data in terms of district magnitude, seat allocation by
party and by method of election (plurality versus PR). I take into consideration that a
number of districts have a significantly higher proportion of indigenous inhabitants. It
will be very difficult to control for this variable numerically, because a significant
number of indigenous people are not registered with the government, and reliable census
data is therefore difficult to obtain (Calderon and Laserna 2003). Furthermore,
information about voter registration from the Corte Nacional Electoral 2 does not
discriminate for ethnic background; a distinction between regions with mainly indigenous
voters is therefore difficult to make. Instead, I will consider the linguistic make-up of
each department3 to determine the approximate size of its indigenous population. While
this measure does not provide the exact proportion of indigenous peoples living in each
district, I argue that it is a close estimate of the concentration of native inhabitants. The
data are derived from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia, a governmental
institution.
Table 1.1 shows the estimated percentages of people who speak indigenous
languages for each district. Based on these estimations, I apply a 51 percent threshold to
classify districts with a large indigenous population4 • I argue that this threshold is
meaningful since it includes departments where the majority of inhabitants are
indigenous. If the electoral system produces outcomes representative of the population
these districts should elect larger numbers of indigenous deputies than those where the
majority of the population is white, mestizo, or of another non-native background.
The data that are examined in the analysis come from a variety of sources, such as
the Corte Nacional Electoral of Bolivia, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia,
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the Base de Datos Politicos de las Americas 5, and the website w~vw.bolivia.coJJ1. Crossexamination of the electoral results and distribution of votes by districts, as well as of seat
assignment to candidates, helped validate the data, since the same results were obtained
from governmental, non-governmental, local and international sources.
The effect of the electoral system on party development and party system change
needs to be considered when evaluating electoral system impact on indigenous
representation. Parties have historically been the organizations that were allowed to
participate in electoral competitions; they can therefore be considered the connection
between the ordinary population and the governing elites. Parties' functions also include
the provision of political training and education, so-called grooming, of future candidates.
Due to their organized and, ideally, institutionalized nature, political parties can be a
valuable vehicle for communicating and advancing the interests of small and large groups
of people. In order to achieve adequate indigenous representation in the legislature, it
seems then important that viable parties are able to form and be competitive in electoral
races. The nature of the electoral system in a country has an impact on what type of
parties are able to form and whether they are viable. If the electoral system in Bolivia
then provides an environment supportive of indigenous representation, it should be
reflected, to a certain extent, in the level of development and success of indigenous
parties.
In focusing on indigenous parties in Bolivia over the past ten years (the time span
the current mixed member proportional (MMP) system has been in place), I evaluate the
following questions: have indigenous parties formed? 6 How stable are these parties?
How successful are they? 7 I measure stability in terms of fragmentation, and determine
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whether these parties have suffered from being split up into different factions after
elections. Fragmented parties are considered to be less stable, since they lack internal
cohesion. Stability, as well as viability, will also be considered in years of existence since
1994, since it seems logical that parties that had a longer time to evolve have a greater
chance to recruit membership and gamer voter support, as well as develop their
institutional structure. Finally, I compare their electoral success in both the 1997 and the
2002 elections, specifically in districts with a large indigenous population, as an indicator
of success and viability. Furthermore, I discuss whether the party is characterized as
being moderate or extremist, since centrist or moderate parties generally appeal to a
larger part of the electorate, and therefore seem to stand a better chance at garnering
broader vote support than parties that are ideologically far removed from the center. I do
not expect for these measures to be conclusive, since only ten years and two national
elections have occurred since the MMP system was put in place. However, after a
decade under MMP, the results should, at the very least, be indicative of whether the
current electoral system seems to allow for indigenous representation to occur at all and if
so, at what level.
When considering the politicization of indigenous people in Bolivia, in the sense
of the formation of indigenous factions and political outreach to formerly excluded
communities, one cannot neglect the impact of the LPP. While this is not directly related
to national legislative elections, the decentralization of political power seems to have
significantly increased indigenous political mobilization at the local level. A discussion
of this impact and possible consequences for future representation of indigenous interests
will make this analysis more relevant in terms of institutional change, since political
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representation does not seem to be the result of the electoral system by itself.
Furthermore, since both the MMP system and the LPP were put in place in the same year,
it is difficult to distinguish which factor had the greater impact on the formation of
indigenous parties, and co-collinearity could become a problem.
Discussion and Results

The Electoral System
The MMP system currently used in Bolivia lets voters chose their 130
representatives for the lower chamber of the legislature from two different ballots. Sixtyeight members are chosen in single member districts by plurality voting, and the
remaining sixty-two members are chosen in nine different multi-member districts from
party lists according to PR (Reynolds and Reilly 1997; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Van
Cott 2003a). The PR seats are distributed with a three percent threshold according to the
d'Hondt rule (since 1996). In districts with a small district magnitude, this formula tends
to slightly favor larger parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The overall formula for the
allocation of seats is correctional: Candidates that are chosen in single-member districts
are rewarded seats directly, and PR seats are then allocated as a compensation to reflect
the overall percentage of votes won by each party. 8 This formula is supposed to correct
the distortions created by plurality systems, and therefore make the overall allocation of
seats more proportional (Reynolds and Reilly 1997).
Indigenous parties that were able to win national seats in 2002 9 received 25.4
percent (33 of 130) of available seats, which is, at first glance, fairly proportional to their
27 percent share of the popular vote (in plurality and PR districts combined). When we
look at the district level data, as seen in Table 1.2, we will notice that overall, a higher
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percentage of plurality seats were won by indigenous parties in regions with a high
concentration of indigenous inhabitants. Almost all of the seats distributed under PR
rule to indigenous factions were also won in departments with a high concentration of
indigenous inhabitants. In these districts, it therefore seems that the electoral system
promotes indigenous representation; I focus on these districts in the following discussion.
To be able to draw valid conclusions, the data need to be examined closer: If the electoral
rules truly promote indigenous representation, votes and seats for indigenous members of
parliaments should be increasing with the size of the district. I assume that in the district
with the largest indigenous population, the interest in representing indigenous interests is
the greatest. Therefore, the proportion of indigenous seats won here compared to overall
seats should be greatest.
Table 1.2 shows, however, that the percentage of seats won by indigenous
factions is largest in the department with the second lowest majority margin of
indigenous over non-indigenous inhabitants (La Paz), and lowest in the department with
the smallest majority margin of indigenous residents (Chuquisaca). The difference
between these two districts is a substantial 24 percent. However, Chuquisaca can be
treated as an outlier in this study, because population dynamics here are very close to the
threshold of a 51 percent indigenous majority (see Table 1.1 ). An interesting observation,
however, is that the district that was expected to yield the greatest percentage of
indigenous seats because of its great native population (Potosi, 76% speakers of native
languages) only came in fourth place. While the difference between the result in Potosi
and the other three contenders (La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro) is not substantial
(between 33 and 42 percent of all available seats were won by indigenous factions in all
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four departments), the difference needs to be considered. One could speculate that the
number of districts under plurality has skewed the results. One may argue that in a
department with a larger number of single member districts more indigenous candidates
would have a chance to get elected, since more electoral races could be run. According
to Table 1.2, however, this does not seem to have been the case in the 2002 Bolivian
elections, since candidates in Cochabamba secured five of nine available plurality seats
(or 53 percent), where in La Paz only seven of sixteen seats (or 44 percent) were won. A
department with almost twice as many electoral races for parliamentary seats then was
not able to send a larger percentage of representatives to Congress. Once again the
difference between these two figures is not large, however it should be sufficient to
indicate that the number of plurality districts within one department does not seem to be a
determinant of the proportion of seats won by indigenous parties.
Having considered the number of single member districts within departments, I
will now assess the impact of district magnitude under PR. In comparison, the
differences between the percentages of seats distributed to indigenous parties under PR
are not large. 10 The fact that seats were distributed, however, shows that district-wide,
indigenous parties did receive a substantial amount of votes under PR, otherwise parties
would not have been compensated for their vote share. A larger district magnitude here,
however, seems to have a slightly positive impact on the amount of votes indigenous
parties were able to secure. In La Paz, the department with the largest district magnitude
of fifteen, indigenous parties won 39 percent of votes, where in Potosi (district magnitude
of seven) and Oruro (district magnitude of five) they were able to secure 28 and 31
percent of the vote, respectively. Despite the fact that these differences are not immense,
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we should consider that Potosi and Oruro have a proportionally larger indigenous
population than La Paz (see Table I. I), and therefore have a larger pool of potential
indigenous voters. This finding may indicate that voters are more inclined to select
candidates from indigenous factions if there are more candidates available overall. The
fact that La Paz was able to secure the most seats proportionally in comparison with other
departments may also be a result of the d'Hondt rule, which seems to favor larger parties
in areas with a small district magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart I 989). Since La Paz has
the highest district magnitude of all departments, a small indigenous party like the
Movimiento Indigeno Pachakuti (MIP) could gamer seventeen percent of votes, the
largest percentage it won in any of the departments. In regards to PR then, the relatively
small district magnitude of departments in Bolivia seems to have a slightly negative
effect on indigenous representation.
Another factor that may indicate how representative a Congress member is of his
or her constituency is how well he or she is able to respond to voters' needs and wants.
After all, he or she is the channel through which constituents can communicate their
demands on the government. Table I.3 shows a simple mathematical comparison of the
number of Camera de los Diputados representatives by department and the size of the
population in each department. The results clearly indicate that there are major
differences in terms of how many people each deputy would be representative of ifthe
number of a department's inhabitants was evenly divided between all deputies (plurality
and PR). I cannot claim that the number of persons per representative (Table 1.3) is even
a close approximation to the true number (to assume that each representative would be
responsible to the exact same number of constituents would be highly irrational since
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district sizes and population density vary). However, it is reasonable to assume that this
value gives us an idea of how many people a member of Congress is representative of on
average. Let us consider the case of the largest department, La Paz: If the population was
evenly divided so that each representative would answer to an equal share of constituents,
61,316 people's interests would be represented in Congress by one person. In Pando, the
smallest of the departments population-wise, one legislator represents 4, 759 people.
Even if we consider this comparison extreme (Pando seems to be an outlier), in the
second-smallest district Tarija, the proportion is one representative per 32,378
inhabitants. The difference is therefore substantial.
I would argue that the number of representatives allocated to each department
grossly undermines the representation of the indigenous populace, for several reasons.
The majority of indigenous people, according to the data in Table 1.1, live in departments
with a greater population size. The greater the population size, the more constituents have
to share a representative. I will argue that an MP is more easily able to respond to the
interests of few rather than many. Moreover, representation is not proportional if more
constituents have to share an MP in some areas than in others. If there is a district, for
example, that is comprised of 60,000 people, and they only have one channel to the
government (one representative), it would seem more likely that this particular channel is
too small or inefficient to address all their needs, compared to a district where 5,000
people share access to one representative.
Another factor to consider is that in districts with a higher concentration of the
population, it takes more individuals to successfully vote their representative of choice
into office. Since the indigenous population in Bolivia is concentrated in areas with a
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larger population, this may work to their disadvantage. In districts with a smaller
population, and in the case of Bolivia a smaller concentration of indigenous people, the
number of individuals required to elect a representative is significantly smaller (see Table
1.3). Election results may therefore be skewed towards non-indigenous people, since a
smaller number of them can elect a proportionally larger number of non-indigenous
representatives. Furthermore, when one legislator is representative of a larger number of
constituents than another, it could mean the constituents of the first legislator have less
power to influence the legislative process. I will try to illustrate this idea further with a
simple, hypothetical example:
Let us assume Congress consists of deputies X, Y, and Z, and it is voting on the
implementation of bilingual education for indigenous children. Deputy X is from La Paz,
and therefore representative of a large number of constituents. Deputies Y and Z are
from Pando, and therefore representative of a significantly smaller number of
constituents. When the three deputies vote on bilingual education, each one of their votes
is weighted equally, and legislators Y and Z can easily block the implementation of
bilingual education through their votes. While Deputy X may be the representative of
60,000 people, deputies Y and Z combined may only represent the voices of 10,000
people. Constituents of deputies Y and Z are therefore at an advantage: They have two
rather than one channel of communication to share between fewer of them (they have two
representatives), they have more influence over the decisions that are being made in
Congress because they have more voting power. Bolivians, then, that live in areas with a
high population concentration, may be disadvantaged. The number of representatives per
department is constant, so if one deputy's district has less inhabitants, another one's
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district in the same department will have more. Overall, then, the total population of the
department is represented by that fixed number of deputies, which determines how much
the people's vote counts. Since indigenous people are concentrated in the areas with
larger populations, I argue that their representation suffers, and that they tend to have
fewer deputies and therefore votes in Congress to get their policy interests realized. This
unequal distribution of seats per share of the population (see Table 1.3), then, seems to be
one of the factors that can help explain why the indigenous population in Bolivia, which
makes up an estimated 60-70 percent of the entire populace, is only represented through
25 percent of the votes in the lower house of Congress.
Parties
The formation of political parties as vehicles for indigenous representation in the
Bolivian Congress has been only moderately successful. Throughout the past, and to a
certain extent in the present, indigenous parties have been plagued with the same growing
pains as most other Latin American factions. These include, for example, fragmentation
caused by internal struggles over leadership and agenda, a short period of subsistence
which may prevent members from gaining enough experience to be fit for electoral
competition, corruption, clientilism and personalism, and, specifically in the case of
indigenous parties, the mobilization of enough voters to succeed in elections (as was
mentioned before, many indigenous people are not registered with the government) (Patzi
Paco 1999). Furthermore, party registration rules and other institutional "hurdles" made
it difficult for indigenous parties to gain a foothold in national elections.

11

To

understand the development of indigenous parties in Bolivia better, I explore their
historical background briefly.
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Initially, in the late 1970s, there were two different camps of indigenous ideology:
the radical Indianismo and the more pragmatic Katarismo. 12 The latter of the two became
more successful, partially due to an image that was of a more liberal and less ethnicbased nature, and therefore attractive not just to Indians but also to those who could
provide political and financial support. Electoral alliances with non-indigenous factions
were also helpful in garnering votes. The Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Karati de
Liberaci6n (MRTKL) succeeded in winning two seats in the lower chamber of Congress
in 1985. In 1993 the Vice-President of Bolivia came from this party, made possible
through an electoral alliance with the right-wing Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionaria (MNR) (Van Cott 2003a). However, the electoral success did not
continue, due in part to the fact that party leader Victor Hugo Cardenas failed to
consolidate the MRTKL as a viable, independent political party. Most indianismo and
katarismo parties split into different factions and died in the 1980s.
Other indigenous parties formed out of indigenous movements and federations.
The highland Indians organized the Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores
Campesinos 13 de Bolivia (CSUTB} in 1979, which became one of the main vehicles for
party development. The Quechuan coca growers of the Cochabamba region soon
dominated the movement. In the lowlands, the Confederaci6n Indigena del Oriente
Boliviano (CIDOB) was formed a few years later, to organize peasants. The latter
movement was of a less radical nature, and played a key role in gaining support from
,non-indigenous and politically powerful elites. At a meeting of both organizations in

1995, the indigenous party Asamblea de la Soberania de los Pueblos (ASP) was formed

to represent indigenous interests within the established system, and it succeeded in
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garnering a small number of seats in the National Assembly. Disputes between the two
leaders of the party, Evo Morales and Alejo Veliz, led to a split in 1998. The latter of the
two stayed with what was left of the ASP, while Evo Morales founded a new party, the
Instrumento Politico para la Soberania de los Pueblos (IPSP). The ASP's success waned
over the next two elections, while the IPSP (under the registration of the nearly defunct
Movimiento al Socialismo -MAS) was able to win a considerable number of votes in the
2002 elections (21 percent). Additionally, the very young and radical indigenous party
MIP under leader Felipe Quispe 14 was able to secure 6 percent of the popular vote,
despite the fact that the MIP is an opponent to the IPSP (Van Cott, 2003a).
While this could be an indication of the consolidation of indigenous parties and
their interests in the political sphere, we should avoid drawing conclusions too quickly.
While the number of representatives of indigenous interests in the Chamber of Deputies
has risen, this does not guarantee a continuation of this trend in the future. Neither does it
necessarily mean that these parties will be sustained nor attempt to realize indigenous
demands. As can be seen in Table 1.4, no indigenous party has been in existence and
successful for even a decade. No indigenous party has been able to secure a large
number of votes in two consecutive national elections since 1994. Furthermore, three of
the four indigenous factions have not run in two consecutive elections since 1994. An
argument could be made that the IPSP and MIP have taken the place of the Consciencia
de Patria (Condepa) party and the ASP, as the latter two factions have lost their influence
on the political stage due to fragmentation. Condepa, for example, was deeply split
internally after the death of its leader Carlos Palenque (Van Cott 2003b). This shows that
the faction lacked institutionalization and an independent structure, since its leader seems
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to have been the figure that prevented it from collapsing. While it would be difficult to
reason that this is the case with all Bolivian indigenous parties, it is hard to imagine an
IPSP without Evo Morales or an MIP without Felipe Quispe.
The charismatic nature of most successful Bolivian party leaders is a
disadvantage here, because it may prevent parties from building an internal structure that
can survive without the leader. It seems that throughout indigenous party history in
Bolivia, the most promising factions seemed to collapse or split up (non-indigenous
parties have experienced this as well, but to a smaller extent). It is yet to be seen if this is
the case with the IPSP or the MIP. This observation, however, indicates that, so far, the
party system has not been stable since the MMP electoral system was adopted. I argue
that a stable party system, since it should include viable, internally consolidated parties, is
important to achieve indigenous representation in government. Parties that are not yet
steadfast in terms of their platform and organizational structure will most likely be less
effective at channeling demands to the government. Since indigenous people and factions
have traditionally been excluded from the ruling elites and are now just beginning to gain
a foothold in the national legislature, it is especially important for them to develop
factions that are internally coherent and externally competitive with older, more dominant
non-indigenous parties. The electoral system can shape this relationship.
Smaller parties should theoretically be able to benefit from the PR component
(Reynolds and Reilly 1997, Massicotte and Blais 1999). While the plurality system by
itself tends to favor larger parties, it may, in the case of Bolivia, contribute to the
inclusion of smaller parties with a geographically concentrated indigenous constituency.
Table 1.2 reveals that, when indigenous parties were successful, they gained a substantial
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amount of their votes under plurality. Most votes were collected in the department where
they originated, followed by the other departments with a high proportion of indigenous
voters. It seems that the use of the MMP system initially helped the factions gain access
to the legislature by being able to draw on the strong support in their home districts
through plurality. Under a different system, for example PR in one national district,
parties most likely would not have been competitive, with their support base being so
concentrated in one area (Van Cott 2003a). Under the current electoral system, parties
can consolidate their power locally, therefore building a niche from where parties can
attempt to broaden their voter base. The MMP system aided smaller indigenous parties by
helping them to "get a foot in the door" at national politics.
However, until now it seems that this is as far as the electoral system supports
indigenous parties. As discussed before, a stable party system does not seem to have
developed in Bolivia. And there is a down side to the electoral system's tendency to
encourage small party entrance onto the political stage. A largely fragmented system that
allows many minor factions to compete with one another encourages leaders within
parties to pursue their own personalistic goals and split away with their supporters, rather
than trying to work out differences internally and present a unified front externally to
keep the party competitive and therefore viable. Splintering away has at least two
negative effects on a party: First, it diminishes the supporter base a faction has, since it
divides its members and therefore also its potential voters. It therefore will diminish
electoral success. Second, fragmentation discourages intra-party bargaining. This can be
an important experience for future deputies, since bargaining is one of the key functions a
deputy has within Congress, especially in a chamber where seats are divided between
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many parties. Compromise between different factions is essential to get any legislation
passed, unless there is one party that has the absolute majority, which is not the case in
Bolivia. A system that encourages competition between small indigenous parties rather
than their consolidation therefore seems incapable of yielding stable, viable indigenous
factions.
The electoral system also promotes the success of extremist parties. Felipe
Quispe's MIP, for example, is considered to be radical even by more moderate
indigenous parties. Initially, this party's success created the overall impression that
indigenous representation is increasing. However, I believe that there is not much room
for this party to grow since its agenda and goals appeal to a narrowly defined part of the
indigenous population (the nationalist separatists) (Van Cott 2003b). Furthermore, it
seems that this party has fed on the national mood of dissatisfaction with the
government's policies to garner its votes, as can be seen in its militant mobilizations
against the national government prior to the 2002 elections. If this mood fades, so will
the success of this extremist faction. While it has then helped more militant indigenous
people to garner representation in the national legislature for now, its viability in the
future is questionable. The MIP did not develop out of a grass roots organization where it
could have secured a broad supporter base: its chances for building an independent
internal structure therefore seem limited. That this small, extremist faction was able to
rise at all, illustrates once again how the electoral system promotes splintering among
interest groups, a fragmented party system, and therefore hinders indigenous
representation. The IPSP could, for example, have absorbed the more militant
indigenous interest groups, garnered more seats, and presented a unified opposition to the
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non-indigenous parties. Fragmentation between indigenous parties is what gives the
older, non-indigenous parties an edge, and lets them dominate the political stage while
they represent the minority of the population. I argue that truly proportional indigenous
representation in Congress will not be achieved until a stable party system and unified,
mass-based indigenous parties are able to form and consolidate. While the MMP system
allows parties to enter the political stage, it does not seem to encourage factions to
develop there.
LPP: Law of Popular Participation (Ley de Participaci6n Popular)
Indigenous representation at the municipal level has drastically increased since
the LPP was implemented. Indigenous organizations have been able to draw upon their
local support base and increasingly politicized themselves. In many communities with a
high indigenous population, decentralization has helped them gain a voice in the
administration of local policies. This then shows that the formation of indigenous parties
and their electoral success in the 2002 elections was not only a result of the MMP
electoral system 15 (or more specifically the plurality component that allowed for
regionally based parties to compete), but can also be attributed to decentralization, since
it gave indigenous organizations an incentive to politicize and take on an active role in
the political decision-making processes.
There are negative aspects of the LPP, however, also for the development of
indigenous parties, which need to be considered. In a number of municipalities, the
OTBs were created as parallel organizations to existing indigenous community structures,
which excludes traditional indigenous authorities from being included in the political
process (Andersson 1999). This, in tum, alienates the indigenous population from
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control over their areas, and can prevent the formation oflocal political entities that have
the potential to grow and improve representation of indigenous interests at the national
level. Furthermore, it seems that the national government can rid itself of responsibilities
it cannot satisfy, and simply transfer them to municipal administrations, knowing that it is
not possible to satisfy these demands at the municipal level either. The national
government can then use the municipal governments as a "scapegoat" for the failure to
address pressing issues.
The allocation of 20 percent of government revenues to the municipal authorities
is also part of the LPP. The purpose of these funds, despite the fact that they are often
insufficient, is to give local governments the means to address regional problems, and to
prevent mass migrations to the urban areas (Calderon and Laserna 2003). However,
since the use of these funds is mainly overseen by OTBs, problems can develop.
Differences in fund allocation can cause conflicts between different organizations and
regions, preventing the successful evolution of mass based indigenous parties. In areas
where the OTBs are not representative of the majority-indigenous population (as
discussed above), the power over the distribution of funds by the non-indigenous elites
further alienates the indigenous people from the political process, defying them the
opportunity to represent their interests, and to consolidate their local power at the national
level. While the LPP then, at first glance, has helped increase indigenous politicization at
the local level, and therefore helped create a platform from where to make the leap to the
national level, it has not succeeded to do so evenly throughout Bolivia. In some areas, it
has even promoted the exclusion oflocal indigenous organizations from the political

31

process, and thereby further alienated the native population from achieving
representation.

Conclusions
The findings of this analysis suggest that the political representation of indigenous
people in the lower house of the legislature has been negatively affected by the MMP
electoral system. The small district magnitude in PR departments has dampened
indigenous parties' success. Districts with a high population density, where indigenous
people are concentrated, have less representation in Congress, because in these areas,
more people have to share the same deputy than people in less densely inhabited regions.
The plurality component of the electoral system has helped small indigenous factions
gain access to the political stage, but at the same time encourages fragmentation within
those factions. This prevents indigenous parties from consolidating their internal
structure and support base, and therefore diminishes their viability. While these
institutional factors have affected indigenous representation in Bolivia negatively, there
may be more complex dynamics that may have contributed to the chronic underrepresentation of the majority of the countries' inhabitants.
It is, for example, important to note the potential effects of economics on the

representation of native peoples in the political system. Being poor and being indigenous
are strongly associated with one another in Latin America, which makes it difficult to
differentiate between economic and social inequality (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
1994). Poor sectors of society usually suffer from lack of representation, since they
generally have less access to political resources, which can affect voter turnout, for
example. Potential supporters for indigenous parties may therefore be excluded from the
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political process. This pool of potential pro-indigenous voters becomes even larger when
we consider the ten percent of indigenous who have not been registered with the
government, and are therefore deprived of their right to vote (Calderon and Laserna
2003).
Indigenous culture and tradition could also negatively affect their drive for
political representation. Many Indigenous communities are socially and economically
organized into ayllus, have their own institutions that deal with processes for grievances,
and that redistribute income within the community. One example is the cargo system: A
cargo is the duty to serve as a leader. All male members of the community have to fulfill
cargos at different levels. They start at the lower levels, and move up to be the head
leader later in life, when they have gained the necessary experience. All holders of a
cargo are members of the council of authorities, and any decision regarding the
community requires consensus from this institution. The leader's power is further
restricted because each cargo is held for one year only (Andersson 1999). To indigenous
people, the nationally institutionalized system of representation may therefore seem
foreign and hard to understand, and may make them reluctant to participate in formal
political processes. Corruption within the political system, the clientilistic nature of
parties, and the increasing urbanization of native peoples are also among factors that may
be considered in future research on indigenous representation in the Bolivian political
system.

NOTES:
1

Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe, Bolivian indigenous leaders and members of the national legislature,
both asserted in 2003 that if congressional activities did not achieve the goals they had set for indigenous
policies, they would create social mobilizations (Van Cott 2003a). This demonstrates the idea that extra-
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systemic measures are a reaction to the failure of the system to provide more indigenous representation to
satisfy interests from within.
2 The Corte Nacional Electoral is the institution that organizes, administers and validates elections in
Bolivia. http://www.cne.org.bo
3 What I refer to as "departments" are regional PR districts, as to avoid confusion with single member
districts, which are labeled "districts".
4 The departments that met this threshold were La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi.
5 This database is maintained by Georgetown University and the Organization of American States.
http://www.Georgetown.edu/pdba
6 Indigenous parties are defined as parties that proclaim the introduction and advancement of inherently
indigenous interests to be the major part of their electoral agenda, that have developed out of indigenous
communities, and whose membership is mainly comprised of indigenous people.
7 A party should be considered viable if it can achieve electoral success (here: obtain seats in the
legislature).
8 If one party wins three seats through plurality and seven seats in PR districts, it is entitled to three seats
from single-member districts and four compensatory PR seats, for a total of seven seats.
9 These parties were the Instrumento Politico para la Soberania de los Pueblos (ISPS), and the Movimiento
Indigeno Pachakuti. The ISPS was not able to register as a political party, and therefore used the
registration of the nearly defunct Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Van Cott 2003a).
10 The percentage of seats received under PR (see Table 1.2) is not reflective of the actual percentage of
votes received in PR districts, because PR seats are allocated as a compensation in addition to seats not won
in plurality districts.
11 One example of these "hurdles" is the law that required parties who did not win at least 50,000 votes to
pay for printing their ballots (Van Cott, 2003a). Funding is an issue for most small parties, and especially
for indigenous parties since Indians are mostly part of the lower class.
12 Indianismo is anti-white and anti-Western and rather radical. Its most successful faction was the
Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA). Katarismo incorporates both Western and non-Western
cultures, and is generally more moderate (Patzi Paco 1999).
13 CSUTB was the first unified independent peasant organization in Bolivia (Van Cott 2000).
14 MIP was founded in 2000, but registered only about 3 months before the June 30 elections (Base de
Datos Politicos de las Americas). Felipe Quispe and his party seek a separate Aymara nation under precolonial government structures.
15 Prior to the 1994 reforms, deputies were elected in one closed-list national PR district. For the most part,
indigenous factions performed poorly under this system (Van Cott 2003a).
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Table 1.1: Indigenous Linguistic Concentration in Bolivia
Department
Toa
t 1 P op. D ep. s·1ze* In.
d Lang. ** In.
d Lang o/co Rank+
Potosi
491,691
645,889
4
76.12%
1
Oruro
234,892
69.06%
2
340,114
6
1,110,205
731,302
65.87%
Cochabamba
3
3
La Paz
1,126,773
59.27%
1,900,786
1
4
Chuquisaca
244,087
53.79%
453,756
5
5
Santa Cruz
234,577
1,364,389
17.19%
2
Pando
4.86%
38,072
1,860
9
Tarija
10.86%
291,407
13,638
7
Beni
276,174
25,881
9.37%
8
*Departments are ranked by overall population size, 1 being the largest.
**This value is determined by the number of people who speak indigenous languages,
including Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, and minor native tongues (source: Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia: www.ine.gov.bo).
+Districts with a majority of indigenous people (51 %+)are ranked according to size of
indigenous population, 1 being the largest.
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5

2

9

7

8

*Chuquisaca

Santa Cruz

Pando

Tarija

Beni

,

5
5

0
0
0

-

3

11

0

-

4
2

0

0%

5

11

0

0

2

5

15

9

5

7

Magnitude

PR
District

0%

0%

0%

1

17%

6

1

6

44%

16

2

2

1

PR
Indig.
Elected
MAS/MIP

53%

40%

50%

plurality
%
seats

Bor ·

9

5

8

plurality
Total
Districts

5

7

4

1

*La Paz

5

3

plurality
Indig.
Elected
MAS/MIP

de los Dioutad

3

-

c

*Cochabamba

7

2

-

2

-

6

-

*Oruro

--

4

-

1

-

4

-

*Potosi

- -

In dig.
Pop.
Size
Rank**

-

Pop.
Size
Rank

~

Dept.
Name

--

18%
18%

20%

7%
3%

0%

3%
0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

9%

42%
39%

40%

10%

39%

38%

22%

18%

40%

31%

40%

33%

Total ind.
seats

28%

PR%vote
Ind.

14%

PR
%
seats

avg: 17%
14
62/avg.7
23%
Totals
19
68
*districts with a high concentration of indigenous peoples
average indigenous members elected by plurality in* districts: 46.75%
average indigenous members elected by PR in * districts: 29%
average DM in * PR districts: 9
** Districts with a majority of indigenous people (51 %+) are ranked according to size of indigenous population, 1 being the largest.

-

Table 1.2: 2002 Elect"
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Table 1.3: Representation Measured by Size of Represented Population
D epartment
Pop. s·1ze Rank # 0 fR eps. A vg. P ersons per R~ep.
R ep. R ank**
1,900,786
La Paz*
1
31
61,316
7
Santa Cruz
1,364,389
62,017
22
9
2
61,678
Cochabamba* 1,110,205
3
18
8
43,059
Potosi*
645,889
15
4
6
Chuquisaca*
453,756
41,251
5
11
5
340,114
Oruro*
34,011
6
3
10
Tarija
291,407
7
32,378
2
9
Beni
276,174
39,453
8
4
7
Pando
38,072
4,759
9
1
8
*This is considered a district with a high indigenous population.
**A representative is ranked higher if he represents a smaller number of constituents.
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Table 1.4: Indigenous Party Characteristics Since 1994, Bolivia
1997
2002
y
PR** FPTP*
PR** All"iancea
Part[y
ears
s1prtIS mo d/ ext FPTP*
95-02
1
3.22
IU
ASP
moderate
5.88 (4)
Condepa 94-02
ADN
0
moderate
17.65 (12) 10.79
<1
0
IPSP
98-04
0
moderate
20.59
17.32
MAS
(14)
7.35 (5) 2.58
MIP
00-04
0
extremist
*Percentage of indigenous vs. overall seats under FPTP (Total possible: 68)
**Percentage of votes possible in all PR districts
a Alliance stands for an alliance with a non-indigenous party or the use of a nonindigenous party registration.
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CHAPTER 2: Parallel Electoral Systems and lndii:enous
Representation: A Case Study of Ecuador

Introduction
As has been observed in Bolivia, Ecuadorian Indians have protested frequently
over the past decade. Indigenous people make up between 25 and 35 percent of the
population of Ecuador. The indigenous movement Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades
Indigenas de Ecuador (CONAIE) has traditionally used peaceful uprisings and
demonstrations as a vehicle to push for indigenous demands. The most recent uprising
(levantamiento) happened in January of 2000, when CONAIE and part of the military
joined together to oust then-President Jamil Mahuad. Despite short-lived success, this
levantamiento showed that extra-systemic methods might still hold more promise in
realizing indigenous interests than existing political channels do. Since the uprising
almost four years and a number of political reforms have passed. The latter have been
aimed at improving the channels for citizens' political participation. This examination
then focuses on one aspect of the political system that most directly reflects political
participation: the electoral system, and the effects it has on indigenous political
representation. While overall electoral success has increased, representation does not
seem to have followed that trend. I hypothesize that the Ecuadorian parallel Proportional
Representation (PR) electoral system is partially responsible for the lack of effective
political representation of indigenous demands at the national legislative level. I argue
that the electoral system has discouraged the formation of fully institutionalized
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indigenous factions, and supports unviable alliances between existing indigenous political
movements and other factions.
The dependent variable, political representation can bear many definitions. In this
case, I will follow Lucero' s (2002) layout of a definition of representation in institutional
terms: Representation here means the inclusion of all sectors of society in the legislative
decision-making process, with a proportional amount of input and power over the content
and applicability oflegislation. I measure representation in terms of how many delegates
from indigenous factions are present in the national legislature, and if this number reflects
the proportional amount of voice indigenous people should have in the political process. I
also apply broader terms and evaluate if the delegates are actually responsible for
channeling primarily indigenous demands or have to answer to other ethnic groups as
well.
The electoral system is the main independent variable. I consider a number of its
components, such as vote type, seat allocation, and district magnitude. I examine what
effects these factors could have on the successful evolution of indigenous political actors
(parties or political movements), and their electoral success. This analysis should provide
a greater understanding of whether electoral system dynamics have helped propel greater
indigenous political representation, and why.
Debates in the Literature
The literature on indigenous issues in Ecuador is marked by an abundance that is
not easily matched by the number of works pertaining to the same subject in other
Andean countries. A number of different subjects have been the focus of the debate
surrounding the evaluation of indigenous representation in the political arena, including
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the discussion of social movements, the electoral system during and after the most recent
reforms, and both of those factors' effects on indigenous party and party system
development and institutionalization.
A great part of this scholarly work has concerned itself with the evolution and
success of CONAIE, which is generally credited with being the "most organized and
institutionalized indigenous movement in Latin America." (MacDonald 2002: 176) In
providing a high capacity for the mobilization of indigenous peoples, the movement has
succeeded at uniting the differently motivated interests of diverse indigenous groups
under the umbrella of the struggle for inclusion and participation in the nation's decisionmaking processes. The collective identity of indigenous peoples in Ecuador, achieved
gradually through the linkage of high- and lowland indigenous groups achieved by
CONAIE over a period of almost twenty years, has served as a strategic resource for an
increased national and international visibility of the indigenous population, advanced
through non-violent uprisings and constant bargaining with traditional political elites
(Lucero 2002; MacDonald 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001).
There is a general agreement between scholars such as Flavia Freidenberg (2001)
and MacDonald (2002) that CONAIE has been successful in negotiating indigenous land
claims, advancing communication between political agencies and the social movement,
advancing the indigenous platform from the local to the broader national level, and
pushing for the official proclamation of Ecuador as a plurinational state, to name a few.
However, these achievements, for the most part, took place outside of the direct channels
of political participation by citizens (such as elections, parties, and elected
representatives). It seems that while such achievements are certainly important steps
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forward in the pursuit of direct citizen participation in the political arena, they do not
necessarily provide for political space for indigenous interests within the legislative and
executive branches of government.
The degree of success that Ecuadorian Indians have achieved within these
channels has prompted different evaluations. Flavia Freidenberg (2001 ), as one of the
predominant scholars of indigenous party development in Ecuador, concerns herself with
the evolution and intra-systemic success of the primarily indigenous political
organization Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo Pais (MUPP-NP).
She finds that since the movement first came into existence in 1996, it has been
exceptionally successful at winning seats in the National Assembly, and at channeling the
demands of the indigenous sector of society into the political arena (for example the
consideration of the ethnically motivated differences in the Ecuadorian society). The
author attributes another favorable characteristic to the movement: it has formed around a
program, not a leader, and should therefore be better able to institutionalize.
MacDonald (2002) is more careful in his evaluation of the MUPP-NP. While he
asserts that the movement has been successful in creating political space for indigenous
interests and helped secure some inclusion of the indigenous population into political
decision-making processes, he finds that the movement's deputies in Congress were not
sufficiently unified in the past to effectively participate and affect legislation. It seems
that a political movement that is struggling to join the people representing it in the
legislature is not an internally cohesive faction, therefore lacking institutionalization,
making its predictable success record questionable. A more positive trend has been
observed by Lopez (2002) in his analysis of problems in local and regional elections in
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2000, as he finds that the legitimacy crisis in the Ecuadorian party system is expressing
the growing efficacy of political movements as mechanisms of recruitment and
determination of new rules in the political game. This finding then would suggest that
the MUPP-NP in its current form could indeed be bound for success as it could provide a
legitimate channel for the demands of its constituency.
Ecuador's electoral system for the country's legislature, having changed several
times within the past decade, is the subject of yet another scholarly debate. One has to
differentiate between the literature written during the electoral system changes and the
works that evaluated the way elections were held after the entire reform process was
finished. Pachano's (1998) analysis is centered on a comparison of the Ecuadorian
electoral system before and after the first round of reforms (including the abolition of
both the non-reelection rule and midterm elections for congressional deputies elected in
the provinces). He finds that the new system is rather chaotic, does a poor job at
recruiting candidates outside of the traditional political elites, and therefore does not
succeed at representing the interests of the broader spectrum of society. From this
analysis it could therefore be inferred that the first set of changes to the electoral system
did not have a positive effect on the level of indigenous representation in the national
legislature.
Freidenberg (2003), however, finds the initial changes in the electoral system
beneficial to the Ecuadorian party system overall, since the voter has more control over
who gets elected, and deputies now have a chance at establishing a political career,
possibly making them more eager to please their constituency (in looking at reelection).
The author acknowledges, however, that the new system creates challenges as well, as it

43

facilitates fragmentation within factions, and has not yielded great changes in party
structures overall. In regards to the before-mentioned notion, one needs to keep in mind
that the analysis was made a couple or years after the first set of reforms, and it therefore
seems natural that effects did not yet seem to be great.
Acosta (2002), who focuses on the same time period as Pachano, discusses that
while small electoral districts tend to favor larger parties, the overwhelmingly local
character of most Ecuadorian parties tends to cancel out this impact. Small parties
therefore need to concentrate their efforts in small districts to make up for the lack of a
national electorate. While the author analyzed the electoral system in a different form
than what it is today, this notion could also hold true in present times since the size of the
electoral districts has not changed. This then may present one of the obstacles for the
smaller MUPP-NP in achieving electoral success: small districts are less likely to yield a
significant number of seats in the National Assembly. On the same note, Taagepera and
Shugart (1989) assert that under proportional representation, a larger district magnitude
will yield more proportional results, and that this phenomenon is reversed under plurality.
In Ecuador, where the electoral system is mixed, representation is proportional to the
candidate, but disproportional to parties. Since this can affect indigenous parties or
movements participating in the elections as well, they may experience underrepresentation in the Ecuadorian legislature.
Taagepera and Shugart also explain that a panachage electoral system as the one
that is currently in place in Ecuador allows a rather high degree of freedom to the voter,
but the legitimacy of representation achieved under this system is debatable, since a
party's elected members may be chosen because of the support by voters from other
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parties. As ACE (2001) found, this can lead to a weakened role of parties and encourage
personal cult and local followings. The ambition of MUPP-NP of establishing itself
around a program rather than a leader may be disturbed by the phenomenon discussed
above, further preventing institutionalization.
Examining the positive effects of recent electoral system reforms, Lucero (2002)
and MacDonald (2002) note that the changes have promoted the founding of an
indigenous political movement in the first place, since until 1996 only candidates
affiliated with parties were allowed to run for seats in the national legislature.
My analysis will then add to the existing literature by focusing on the electoral
system's impact on indigenous party representation in the country's legislative body, the
National Assembly, over the most recent election cycles (1998 and 2002). I hope to
show that electoral system factors such as district magnitude, and seat allocation rules, as
well as related factors such as voter turnout and pre-election registration requirements,
indigenous literacy, and the size of the indigenous population in each district affect the
success of indigenous parties in Ecuador.

Data and Methodology
I focus my analysis of the Ecuadorian electoral system on the legislative branch of
government, the National Assembly. This institution is made up of more (100)
individuals than either the executive or judiciary branches, and its members are elected
from each of the twenty-two electoral districts in the country. The National Assembly
therefore provides room for diversity among its members.
I evaluate the outcomes of the 1998 and 2002 legislative elections to assess
electoral system influence on indigenous party representation. I choose these most recent
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elections for two reasons: First, there was no indigenous party or political movement
outside of an alliance with a traditional faction that succeeded in congressional elections
prior to the creation of the MUPP-NP in 1996. Second, reforms that lead to the
Ecuadorian electoral system as we know it today started in 1996, and progressed over the
following few years, to be fully implemented by the 2002 legislative elections. For this
reason, rather than focusing on aggregate, national level data only, I compare district
level data in terms of district magnitude, seat allocation by party, and size of indigenous
population for the most recent election. I argue that indigenous people will be the ones
first and foremost interested in the political representation of their interests, therefore
providing a pool of potential voters for indigenous parties.
Controlling for the variable of indigenous population size by district proves rather
difficult, since reliable census data is very difficult to obtain. Furthermore, the
Ecuadorian census has not differentiated people by ethnicity for over a decade, in an
effort to further the idea of a unified, Ecuadorian nationality (also called homogenization)
(Lucero 2002). There is also a dearth of reliable, accessible data on the linguistic make
up of different regions and districts within Ecuador. The majority of indigenous males
today are bilingual, putting a limitation on the usefulness of the evaluation oflinguistic
make-up for population size (Ecuador 2004). I therefore chose to base my
approximations of indigenous population size on the geographical concentration of
different indigenous nationalities. The cross-examination of data from different sources,
including the Consejo de Desarollo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos de Ecuador (a
governmental institution), CONAIE (MacDonald 2002), Bimir's (2004) estimates and the
website www.nativeweb.org, helps validate the results. While this measure does not
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provide the exact number of indigenous people living in each electoral district, I argue
that it offers a close estimate of native population concentration.
Table 2.1 shows the Ecuadorian electoral districts ranked in order according to
estimated percentages of indigenous inhabitants. Based on these estimations, I apply a
twenty-five percent threshold for the classification of a district as having a large
indigenous population. I argue that this threshold is meaningful for the following reason:
The overall indigenous population estimates for Ecuador lie between twenty-five and
thirty-five percent of the whole population; twenty-five percent therefore serves as a
liberal reflection of that ratio for each district. If the electoral system then produces
results that are representative of the make up of the population, these districts should be
electing a larger proportion of indigenous-party deputies than districts with a lower
proportion of indigenous inhabitants.
Electoral results that are examined in this analysis were obtained from a variety of
governmental, non-governmental, local and international sources, as to ensure their
validity. The same electoral results and seat assignments to candidates were reported by
CNN, the Ecuadorian Congress, the MUPP-NP website, and the Base de Datos Politicos
de las Americas (Georgetown University). The breakdown of deputies per district for the
2002 elections was obtained from the Ecuadorian Congress only, yet I consider these data
valid since there is no obvious reason why the names or partisan affiliation of deputies
currently serving in the legislature should be altered.
The importance of the effect of the electoral system on party development and
party system change has been discussed more extensively in the previous chapter. If the
electoral system in Ecuador promotes indigenous party representation it should be
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reflected in the level of institutionalization and electoral success of indigenous factions.
The following questions will then be addressed through my analysis: have indigenous
parties formed? How successful have they been in the two previous legislative elections?
The electoral system has changed in some significant aspects between the 1998
and 2002 elections (the total number of deputies has decreased, the method of election
and seat allocation has changed). A comparison of the number of seats obtained by any
indigenous factions in either election (a before/after model) will also shed some light on
the way the electoral system influences indigenous party representation. While the
results of such an analysis may only suggest the initial effects of electoral system change
on native political movement representation (since they only cover one election cycle
after the reforms were put in place), they should at least be indicative of whether the way
national deputies are elected is beneficial to indigenous party electoral success.
Furthermore, to measure institutionalization of any indigenous parties, I will
compare the turnover rate for their deputies in the National Assembly. While a high
turnover rate may mean that the leadership of the party is constantly adapting and
evolving to its constituency's needs, it may also mean that the institutionalization of
candidates is in a regressive state (Freidenberg 2001: 391). I will follow the latter
proposal in arguing that an effective deputy is generally an experienced one, and that in a
stable, non-fragmented party environment a deputy would be encouraged by his
faction/movement to gamer such experience and make use of it in advancing their party
agenda.
Finally, I evaluate the question of voter turnout and factors influencing turnout,
such as literacy and poverty. While it would make sense to include pre-election party
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registration rules in this section (authors such as Birnir [2004] suggest that this factor
contributes to the explanation of the lack of indigenous parties in the Andean countries), I
will refrain from doing so for the following reason. In 1996, the Ecuadorian law was
changed to allow political movements and independent candidates to run in national
elections, and the effect of party registration rules (such as the .5% membership quota
that has to be met in at least ten provinces, including two of the three largest) was
therefore diminished substantially. Since it is difficult to obtain reliable turnout data
grouped by ethnic background, or by electoral districts, I will briefly discuss the
implications of overall turnout levels and its relation with indigenous literacy and
poverty.
Results and Discussion
The semi-proportional, or parallel electoral system in place for the National
Congress in Ecuador since 2000 uses open party lists. Voters have an "unlimited" vote
meaning that they can cast as many votes as there are seats allocated to each district
(district magnitude). The voter has the choice between giving all of his votes to one party
list or to candidates from separate lists (and separate parties). Each party pools votes for
individual candidates. Seats are then allocated to the candidates with the largest number
of votes from the most voted lists. The total number of votes per party is used to
distribute seats according to the d'Hondt formula. 1 No adjustments are made as to
compensate for disproportionalities within a district. Ecuadorian voters elect a total of
100 deputies from 22 districts, also referred to as provinces (ACE Project 2001, EU
Election Observation Mission 2002, Freidenberg 2001 ).
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The system used for the 1998 elections was similar to the one explained above,
yet with some differences: party leaders were not allowed to pool votes for individual
candidates, and therefore had no control over the distribution of seats within their party.
Seats were allocated to candidates who received the most votes according to the d'Hondt
formula, indifferent of how many votes their party received overall. Furthermore, in
addition to 101 deputies elected from 21 provinces, twenty deputies were elected in one
single national district (ACE Project 2001, Electoral Observation 1998, Freidenberg
2001). These differences between the two election systems and their impact on
indigenous party representation will be considered later in this section.

Electoral System Characteristics for the National Congress, Ecuador, 1998 and 2002
1998
2002
Total number of deputies
121
100
List type
open
open
Vote type
Unlimited: number of seats Unlimited: number of seats
per district, voter can chose per district, voter can chose
entire party list or
entire party list or
individual candidates across individual candidates across
parties
parties
Seat allocation
Candidates with most votes Parties combine votes for
receive seats, indifferent of all their candidates, most
party total (no vote pooling) voted candidates obtain
seats (vote pooling)
Allocation formula
D'Hondt (not
D'Hondt (not
compensatory)
compensatory)
Electoral Districts
22: one national
22 provincial
21 provincial
Average District Magnitude 5.5
4.5
4.8 without the national
district
The indigenous political movement MUPP-NP was able to secure five percent
(six of 121) congressional seats (Birnir 2004). In 2002 the movement increased its
number of seats in the legislature to eleven, or eleven percent (Pachakutik 2004,
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Congreso Ecuadoriano 2004). Data on the overall percentage of votes the movement
received nationwide is difficult to obtain. While the MUPP-NP is not exclusively
indigenous in membership and agenda, a great part of its mission is to ameliorate the
plight of the indigenous people in Ecuador, and allow for their input and share at political
decision making. 2 The MUPP-NP, also known as Pachakutik, is the institution that most
closely resembles an indigenous party, and therefore presents the primary channel for
indigenous demands between the national government and the people. As Edmundo
Vargas, former president of the Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Amazon
Ecuador (CONFENAIE), explains the movement " ... we understand perfectly what the
indigenous struggle is and what the strategy of the state is, so for this very reason we are
participating in elections as a means ... to construct the plurinational state."(Andolina
1999: 221)
The indigenous population in Ecuador started successfully organizing in the
1980s, when smaller high- and lowland indigenous organizations came together and
formed CONAIE in an attempt to unite national indigenous economic and political
concerns. The Sierra, or highland, Indians, for the most part belonging to Quechuan
nationalities, were mainly concerned with peasant and production issues, where as the
Amazonian or lowland indigenous' struggle was more of a political nature, pertaining to
autonomy and sovereignty rights (Lucero 2002). Since CONAIE was initially of antisystem nature, the movement refused to directly participate in elections until 1995. By
this time, Amazonian indigenous leaders agreed to form the political movement
Pachakutik in order to participate in the 1996 national elections. While the native groups
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in the sierra were not as supportive of this idea, they agreed to back the new movement
for the sake of unity in the political arena (Andolina 1999).
The MUPP-NP makes it a point to define itself as a political movement rather
than a party. For one, the institution wishes to differentiate itself from traditional parties
that have generally failed to address the concerns of the indigenous and socially
marginalized sectors of society. Furthermore, it wants to discourage corruption among its
members that is often fostered by the taking of a centralized direction within an
institution (Freidenberg 2003). While these reasons make sense at first glance, there are
positive and negative structural implications that follow the decision to remain at the
organizational level of a social mass movement. What seems beneficial in terms of
channeling demands from the constituency to the legislature is that power and authority
emerge from the base and move to the top. Pachakutik has executive and political
committees at the county, provincial, and national level, which are responsible for the
political, fiscal, and legal management of the organization. Candidates for the national
legislative elections, for example, are selected at the base level, and then advance through
the provincial to the national level where their candidacy is finalized (Freidenberg 2003).
In addition, the movement can accommodate new ideas and members from different
sectors of society with ease, as it possesses moderate fluidity in its direction of action.
This certainly may make the MUPP-NP attractive to a broader spectrum of
potential voters, but the lack of a principal course of action may at the same time
diminish its effectiveness in achieving specific goals, as the process of the realization of a
goal may be prolonged due to differing opinions about how to get there. Furthermore,
lowland and highland leaders within the movement frequently clash over the faction's
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interests and how to pursue them. Internal coherence is one of the prerequisites for
successful institutionalization of an organization, which in tum provides the values and
stability that can help a faction survive in its political environment. Furthermore, even if
the movement gamers an increased number of votes by appealing to more voters, the
effective translation oflegislative mandates into action may be diminished if the
organization is not cohesive (Huntington 1968). This phenomenon was observable in the
1996 to 1998 legislative period, when MUPP-NP had eight candidates elected to the
national Congress and held 9.76 percent of the seats, but the deputies were not unified
and therefore did not effectively participate in the political arena (Lucero 2002)3. This
observation, however, was made at the initial stages of the Pachakutik movement; many
argue today that the movement has materialized on many characteristics that would
classify it as a viable party (Andolina 1999, Lucero 2002, Freidenberg 2001).
At this point I will argue that despite this assertion by different scholars, this
indigenous movement has not yet institutionalized enough to be labeled as a stable,
effective organization. In addition to coherence, Huntington (1968) mentions
adaptability, complexity, and autonomy as characteristics of an institutionalized party that
would able to channel political participation. While the MUPP-NP seems to satisfy the
first two requirements, it cannot be seen as an autonomous entity. Both Pachakutik itself
and other indigenous-based movements such as CONAIE, the Ecuador Runacanapac
Riccharimui or the Federation of People of Quechua Nationality (ECUARINARI), or
CONFENAIE have made claims repeatedly that they are independent of one another, and
that the MUPP-NP does not serve as their political arm. However, representatives from
those other movements are part of the final decision-making structures within Pachakutik,
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such as the National Executive Committee and the Political Committee (Freidenberg
2003). Movement leaders such as former ECUARINARI presidents Salvador Quishpe
and Ricardo Ulcuango actually serve as deputies for the MUPP-NP in the national
legislature. I will therefore argue that the Pachakutik movement is a subordinate of other
indigenous organizations under the leadership of CONAIE, acting according to their
interests.
The MUPP-NP has seen a lot of turnover in leaders and deputies since its
foundation almost a decade ago. This is especially observable between the two most
recent elections: not a single deputy that was elected to the National Congress in 1998
was re-elected in 2002. While it could be argued that this is an indication of the ongoing
self-renewal process that the movement is undergoing in its strive to maintain the identity
of a political movement rather than a party, it is also a sign of a lack of
institutionalization. For one, I contend that political actors who are experienced tend to
be more effective at translating the demands of their constituency into successful policy,
as they should have a better idea of the mechanisms and dynamics that surround their
office. Secondly, as a political movement, one of the institution's roles is to educate and
teach junior members in their roles as representatives of their constituency. It seems
obvious that senior deputies in Congress could fulfill this function for newly elected
parliamentarians in the same legislative block, yet no such senior members are available.
It also seems that with growing incumbency a legislator's chances at reelection increase,

which could give the movement an advantage in securing more seats and therefore
influence in Congress. As Freidenberg (2001) notes, the electoral arena in Ecuador is
saturated with candidates, and people therefore tend to vote for those whom they know.

54

Having dicussed the history and structure of the Pachak:utik movement, I now tum
to the effects of the electoral system on the MUPP-NP and its electoral success in the
national legislature. In both 1998 and 2002, voters could cast as many votes as there
were seats available within their district, and combine them within or across party lists.
Such a system could encourage political movements, parties, and campaigns to be
centered around a person rather than an ideology or political agenda, because it may give
the voter the impression that the candidate is spatially closer to him than the party, since
he can chose candidate over party. This can give candidates with a strong local identity a
special edge, even if his party agenda and ideology would not fit with the voter's.
The event of frequent turnover in the MUPP-NP discussed above could also be
attributed to this tendency of Ecuadorian political movements and elections to be
personalistic and locally rather than nationally centered. In order to attract voters, it
seems inherent that Pachakutik would first and foremost center their election run on
particular well-known local personalities, especially considering the movement's bottomto-top candidacy nomination structure. How is this a problem?
First of all, it encourages competition within the party. When there are multiple
candidates running for the MUPP-NP in one province (as there most definitely will be
since there are at least two seats to contest per district), they will be running against each
other in an attempt to secure a large enough vote share to ensure a seat in Congress. Only
the candidates with the highest number of votes within Pachak:utik may be able to accept
a legislative mandate in Quito. Building on this logic, I then agree with the claim that
various scholars have made about personalistic, local Ecuadorian factions: they tend to
encourage fragmentation within an organization (Freidenberg 2001a, Acosta 2002,
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Pachano 1998). Fragmentation is the opposite of coherence, and can therefore help
prevent the successful institutionalization of an organization such as the MUPP-NP.
Secondly, if a voter supports the Pachakutik's agenda, but does not like the candidates the
party is running, he may decide to give his votes to contenders from other parties whom
he likes better on a personal level, which in tum would be a loss for the movement
overall.
In the 1998 election, intra-party competition resulting from Pachakutik candidates
running against each other may very well have played a role in the small amount of
congressional seats the faction was able to obtain (especially considering the large drop
from holding 10 percent of the total seats in 1996 to just under five in 1998). The
absence of vote pooling seems to have further exacerbated this problem, as the votes the
candidates received directly were the only ones that counted. If a faction's votes were
spread out among candidates with this type of system, the risk that the institution as a
whole would be underrepresented in the legislature was great. Vote pooling was first
effectively used in the 2002 elections. This change to the way of allocating seats may
have been able to curb some of the negative effects of the unlimited vote. While
competition amongst candidates may still lead to fragmentation within a faction, it could
be argued that the candidates' votes combined will help the faction's overall chances at
gaining a seat. Pachakutik was able to gain eleven seats in the 2002 elections, and
therefore increased its presence in Congress by over 80 percent.
The unlimited vote and the way of seat allocation also merit another effect of the
electoral system, especially visible in regards to the MUPP-NP. I argue that by giving
the voter the freedom to choose between candidates and parties, and introducing the
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pooling of votes by party, the electoral system encourages electoral alliance formation,
thereby further diminishing the establishment of a centralized direction of the MUPP-NP.
My argument is built on the notion that by forming electoral alliances, a movement's or
party's agenda and campaign have to be attuned to each other. I argue that to appeal to
the voters of two or three different movements a party's agenda has to be amalgamated
with some of the other factions' ideas, and may therefore be stirred away from its initial
path. If Pachakutik's focus, for example, was on advancing a mostly indigenous demand
such as bilingual education, an alliance with a socialist party like PSP may appeal to the
MUPP-NP's socialist sector, and help gamer ''otes for Pachakutik from supporters of the
PSP. In the end, however, the responsibility of a deputy elected from such an alliance
would be less to the indigenous sector of the Indian movement striving to realize
bilingual education than to the socialist division that can be found within both
movements, striving for example for redistribution of revenues and more government
involvement in the economic sector. I am not arguing that this would be against
indigenous demands, rather I am trying to content that the initially within Pachakutik
more prevalent Indian demands will be put on the "back burner" (I will refer to this as the
"mixing effect" from here on out).
While MUPP-NP started out at the ideological center, it moved towards the left
during its development. Today, the movement almost explicitly aligns itself with the
leftist socialist sector (except for the 1998 alliance with the right-wing Democracia
Popular in the province Pastaza). Most of the leftist parties share the same ideas: they are
against neo-liberal economic policies, they want a social democracy (a social "safety
net"), more equality for the lower sectors of society (redistribution), and they want to end
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political corruption (Freidenberg 2003). Pachakutik repeatedly stresses that it is different
from the traditional left parties in that it strives for unity in diversity rather than
separatism (Pachakutik 2004). However, by forming electoral alliances with the other
leftist factions, the message the indigenous movement sends out is one of similarity with
those other factions, rather than one of presenting an alternative to them.
In 1998, Pachakutik won the majority (or 66 percent) of its seats on lists
pertaining only to its movement. By 2002, only 45 percent of seats were won on such
lists (see Table 2.2). All new seats won in districts where no seats were previously held
were won within a new electoral alliance. Only in Zamora Chinchipe part of the 1998
alliance remained intact (MUPP-NP/PS-FA), and here the exit of the traditional party
Izquierda Democratica actually seems to have propelled a 26 percent and 2-seat gain for
the alliance. This is the largest vote increase for the MUPP-NP in all electoral districts,
potentially signaling that Pachakutik voters here prefer a course away from traditional
parties.
Looking at the overall picture, Zamora Chinchipe does not appear to be an outlier.
In the majority of districts, votes for the MUPP-NP (when within an alliance) increased
by less than fifteen percent in 2002. In three of these four cases (Azuay, Chimborazo,
and Pichincha), Pachakutik aligned itself with the more contemporary Partido Sociedad
Patri6tica 21 de Enero (PSP) rather than a more traditional party. Within districts where
the MUPP-NP was able to win seats on their exclusive party list, vote percentages
remained relatively stable, winning or losing about five percentage points. This may tell
us a couple of things: First of all, it could mean that the gains in the "alliance districts"
may have been caused by the supporters of the non-Pachakutik alliance partner, based on
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the idea that ifthe MUPP-NP thought it would have been able to gain sufficient votes on
its own it would have ran its own list. Once again, the "mixing effect" of priorities
discussed above comes into play. The broader a movement "fans out", the less it is going
to be able to focus on a particular sector's demands. Second, it could mean that in its
drive for a truly plurinational image the indigenous movement aligns itself with the party
that comes closest to its own ideals, and can bring out the vote in a district. The PSP, for
example, while classifying itself as a party, calls for a more socialist, plurinational state
like the MUPP-NP does, and is a rather modem movement. Part of its name is the "21 st
of January" which refers to the indigenous-backed uprising in January of2000 that
ousted President Mahuad (Macdonald 2002, PSP 2004). This may show that the two
factions have ideological similarities, and that working together can help the gain of more
congressional seats that could ultimately be translated into a larger influence over
legislation. The PSP, however, seems somewhat more radical and reformist than
Pachakutik, and an alliance like this can affect the peaceful, intra-system approach the
MUPP-NP has pursued throughout its history.
Overall, then, when we look at Pachakutik as being the political advocate of the
mostly indigenous, and at the leftist parties as being the advocate of the lower classes in
society overall, we should not over-value the gain the indigenous have made in their
representation in Congress. If we count only the seats that Pachakutik won on its own
(and therefore make it responsible to only its own constituency), the difference between
1998 and 2002 is merely one seat (see Table 2.2). Consequently the introduction of vote
pooling may have had a slight positive effect on indigenous electoral success, but that
while the overall seat count for the MUPP-NP and some of it electoral alliances has
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increased substantially, the channels for primarily indigenous demands have not
increased at the same level.
In considering the make up of electoral districts in relation to votes for
indigenous representatives, it is quite noticeable that the majority of seats were won in
districts classified as having a large indigenous population (see Table 2.2.), which seems
natural given the fact that the indigenous would be the ones caring about their own
demands. Only in Pastaza and Tungurahua no member of the MUPP-NP was successful.
While we can treat Tungurahua as an outlier, since population dynamics here are very
close to the 25 percent threshold, the result for Pastaza is quite surprising since the
province is home to the second largest share of indigenous people in the whole country
(47 percent). In looking at Table 2.2, it becomes obvious that the MUPP-NP ran with the
center-left Democracia Popular (DP) in 1998, and was able to gain a seat then, yet ran on
its own in 2002. This may have two possible implications: First, Pachakutik may not
have succeed in 2002 partially because it lost its DP supporters. Or second, the MUPPNP did not succeed because it was associated with DP in the last elections, and DP has
lost its popularity in Pastaza. Both of these situations show the negative effects that
alliance formation for gaining seats can have. In such a setting, partners are always
dependent on the level of support the other has. Looking at the election results, it seems
the second scenario is more likely the case. The DP did not secure any seats in Pastaza in
2002 (Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, 2004). Pachakutik, then, may have lost its chances
for a seat because it was associated with what caused the support for DP to decline. The
tendency of the electoral system to encourage alliances may then in actuality play out
negatively in respect to MUPP-NP success.
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A great example for the disadvantages that alliance formation and dependence
bears for the indigenous community can be found in the break-up of the governing
coalition of Ecuador in August of 2003. The PSP, party of President Lucio Gutierrez,
who was elected with Pachakutik support, evicted the MUPP-NP from the ruling
coalition in Congress because most of its legislators had voted against a presidential civil
service reform proposal (Taylor 2003). The movement, as the representative of the
indigenous population, was ousted because the indigenous interest in blocking the reform
collided with its alliance partner's interest to pursue the restructuring of the civil service.
While the alliance then initially gave Pachakutik a position from where it could directly
influence the country's policy, the practical exercise of that influence was limited.
Alliance formation, then, as illustrated above, could increase a faction's dependence on
the other partner and therefore limit the range of policy interests the former can support
for its constituency.
The districts of Sucumbios, Pichincha, and Zamora Chinchipe, which have a
relatively small share of the indigenous population (twelve, ten, and three percent,
respectively), all elected congressional representatives from Pachakutik in 2002 (see
Table 2.3). In all three districts, the indigenous movement ran in alliance with other
parties, which may be one of the factors that helped them gain seats. The notion that
alliances will not serve the realization of indigenous demands as well as "pure" MUPPNP mandates could be applied here. Since these three districts have a proportionally
small number of indigenous inhabitants, it seems natural that Indian demands would only
appeal to the majority in the sense that they may include ideas common to a variety of
social classes. The indigenous may therefore have gained representation for these
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demands, but not for the ones that pertain directly to them. Other factors that may have
helped the MUPP-NP and its alliance partners is that in Pichincha and Sucumbios votes
were very fragmented and split up between a large number of candidates. Since a large
number of their joint candidates received a small amount of votes each, the sum as a
whole ensured them a seat.
Another variable known to affect representation is district magnitude (Cox 1997,
Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The average district magnitude (adm) in the different
provincial districts in Ecuador seems to have changed moderately between the 1998 and
2002 legislative elections (from 5.5 to 4.5). This can largely be attributed to the abolition
of the large national district, as the majority of provincial districts have maintained the
same number of representatives. When comparing the adm for 1998 without the national
district with the adm for 2002 (4.8 versus 4.5, respectively), the results show that adm has
only slightly decreased in the most recent election. Should this have an effect on the
political success of indigenous factions?
Initially, one may suggest that it might have a slightly positive effect on
indigenous party representation, since a substantially higher number ofMUPP-NP
members were elected to the Congress in 2002. However, smaller district magnitude is
generally thought to have a negative effect on small party success (Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, Cox 1997). This does not seem to be the case in Ecuador: Table 2.2 shows
that the district magnitude remained the same in almost all the provinces where
Pachakutik deputies gained seats. In two provinces, Morona Santiago and Sucumbios, the
indigenous movement was even able to gain a seat despite a decline in district magnitude
(see Table 2.2.).
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One explanation for this could be, as Acosta (2002) argues, that the local
character of the Pachakutik movement (and Ecuadorian parties in general) annuls the
negative impact of small districts. The movement also may have been able to better
mobilize the indigenous voters in 2002 since it has had a greater time span to do so (after
its formation in 1996 it had two years to campaign before the next election vs. having
four years between 1998 and 2002). As discussed above, alliance formation may have
very well influenced this outcome as well. Overall, every one of the districts here
classified as having large indigenous populations is rather small in size, with the largest
district magnitude being four. Furthermore, most provinces where the Pachakutik
movement was not successful (exceptions here are the large provinces of Guayas,
Pichincha, and Manabi) have a district size comparable to that of the districts where the
MUPP-NP was able to gamer seats. I will then argue that taken as a whole, district
magnitude does not seem to have a significant influence over the success of indigenous
parties in Ecuador, since a large increase in indigenous party seats was observed despite
minimal changes to the size of electoral districts.
Table 2.3 reveals another interesting observation. In the majority of districts, the
percentage of the vote cast for the indigenous movement was significantly lower than the
percentage of the indigenous population. I cannot assume that all indigenous voters will
cast their vote for Pachakutik, however there may be other factors relevant here than
simply voter choice. Voting in Ecuador is mandatory for people between eighteen and 65
years of age, and voluntary for people older than that and the illiterate (Electoral
Observation 1998). Despite the obligatory vote, large rates of defection and invalid votes
have been observed. While I do not have access to district level data, recent studies have
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shown that literacy rates among the indigenous are much lower than among other ethnic
groups (UNICEF 2004, Committee 2003, Proyecto Condor 2004, Freidenberg 2001).
Illiteracy could have effects on indigenous voter turnout, and therefore indigenous party
success, for the following reasons: Since voting is not mandatory for illiterates, it is very
likely that fewer of them would vote than if a penalty would threaten them in case they
do not. Secondly, illiterates would have a more difficult time deciphering ballots, and
gathering information about candidates. Thirdly, illiteracy is often tied to poverty, and
poverty is often tied to low voter turnout, since people that are struggling economically
are generally more concerned with survival than political participation (Rosenstone
1982). Indigenous illiteracy could therefore be considered a disadvantage in the
realization of Pachakutik success, simply because it may keep potential supporters away
from the poles. And low voter turnout in a system where votes count individually can be
detrimental to a faction's success, if a great part of those who do not participate
politically belong to that faction's pool oflikely supporters.
Conclusions
The results of this analysis suggest that the parallel PR electoral system in
Ecuador may have negative effects on indigenous representation in the national
legislature. The independent vote seems to encourage the personalistic character of
political factions, thus encouraging competition amongst leaders within the institution,
potentially leading to fragmentation. This apparent lack of coherence along with little
autonomy and a high turnover rate for legislators within the MUPP-NP have lead me to
conclude that the level of institutionalization within this movement is low. While the
introduction of vote pooling in the 2002 elections seemed to dampen the effect of
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competition among intra-faction elites in elections, conflict between lowland and
highland sectors of the movement persist, still threatening fragmentation and therefore
potentially inhibiting further institutionalization. This may then lessen the ability of
Pachakutik to efficiently communicate and realize indigenous participation in the national
Congress, as institutionalization is an important factor in determining party viability and
effectiveness.
Vote pooling also seems to encourage alliance formation, which may have helped
Pachakutik gain seats in the legislature, particularly in 2002. This apparently positive
effect on indigenous representation in Congress is quickly neutralized when one
considers the increasing dependence between the factions involved in an alliance, which
in turn could affect what issues the alliance focuses on, potentially neglecting pressing
indigenous demands.
District magnitude, against expectations, does not seem to play a large role in the
determination of the level of indigenous representation in Ecuador. Against common
assertions, the small Pachakutik movement was able to garner the majority of its votes in
small districts, and gain seats in the legislature despite a small decrease in average district
magnitude.
Ecuador's Indians are counted among the best organized and politically involved
in South America. While this analysis did not serve to counter this fact, it should be seen
as a reminder that true multiculturalism is still a ways away. As the traditionally
marginalized indigenous move towards greater inclusion into the decision-making
processes in their country, institutional factors such as the electoral system can become
obstacles on the way to achieving political representation. The consideration of such
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factors should be helpful when designing policy alternatives that could remove such
obstacles.

1 This formula uses successive divisors. For more detailed information see Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew
Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants ofElectoral Systems. New Haven:
Yale University Press: p. 32.
2 Besides indigenous interest groups (such as CONAIE, ECUARUNARI, COFENAIE etc.) and other
indigenous members, the Pachakutik movement also includes participants from the public sector (i.e. oil
and electricity), social movements, religious groups, leftists, and intellectuals. For further information, see
Freidenberg, Flavia. 2001. "Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo Pais". In Manuel
Alcantara Saez y Flavia Freidenberg, eds. Partidos Politicos de America Latina: Paises Andinos.
Salamanca, Spain: Universidad de Salamanca.
3 At the time, each deputy in the Pachakutik block was going his or her own way. See Lucero, Antonio.
2002. Arts of Unification: Political Representation and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador.
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 101-103.
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Table 2.1: Indigenous Population per Electoral District, Ecuador
T ota I p op ** o/co I n d ..
p ***Rank D .p .I 98 2 D .p .I 0 23
Azuay
599,546
5
5
6
1
Bolivar*
169,370
4
3
1
3
29
1
Cafiar
206,981
3
3
18
Carchi
152,939
3
3
0
Chimborazo*
403,632
4
4
50
1
1
Cotopaxi*
349,540
4
28
3
1
1
5
4
El Oro
525,763
0
5
Esmeraldas
403,632
4
1
4
2
Galapagos
18,640
0
2
Guayas
3,309,034
5
18
18
Imbabura*
344,044
1
3
1
40
3
3
Loja
404,835
4
5
4
Los Rios
650,178
0
5
5
Manabi
1,186,025
5
8
8
Morona
115,412
26
2
1
6
3 (1)
Santiago*
Napo*
79,139
25
2
1
7
3
1
Orellana
86,493
2
19
(1)
Pastaza*
61,779
2
2
47
2
Pi chincha
2,288,817
14
14
1
10
2
1
Sucumbios
128,995
12
3
Tungurahua*
441,034
4
4
26
6
Zamora
76,601
2
2
3
2
Chinchipe
Totals
101 4(6) 100 11
*Districts with a high concentration of indigenous people.
**This data is derived from the Ecuadorian Census in 2001. See the Instituto Nacional de
Estadistica y Censos. htm://w\vw.iqec.gov.ec
***Percentage of indigenous population compared to overall population in the district.
1: Number of provincial deputies in the National Assembly for the district, 1998/2002.
2: Number of provincial deputies from the MUPP-NP indigenous movement elected in
that district during the 1998 legislative elections. Two additional deputies from the
MUPP-NP indigenous movement were elected in a single national district in 1998.
3: Number of provincial deputies from the MUPP-NP indigenous movement elected in
that district during the 2002 legislative elections.
p rovmce
.
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Table 2.2: National MUPP-NP Deputies Electoral Lists, by Province, Ecuador
Province

1998 MUPP*

Alliance**

2002

MUPP*

Alliance**

Azuay
1
MUPP/PSP
1
'1
Bolivar
1
'1
1
Cotopaxi
1
~
'1
1
MUPP/PSP
Chimborazo
'1
MUPP/PS-F A/MCNP 1
Imbabura
1
1
Morona
1
'1
'1
Santiago
Napo
1
1
'1
'1
Pastaza
1
MUPP/DP
MUPP/PSP
Pichincha
1
MCNP
Sucumbios
1
MUPP/PS-FA
2
Zamora
Chinchipe
MUPP: Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais
PS-FA: Partido Socialista Ecuartoriano - Frente Amplio
MCNP: Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais
DP: Democracia Popular
PSP: Partido Sociedad Patriotica 21 de Enero
*single list MUPP-NP
**combined lists
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Table 2.3: Vote for MUPP-NP Deputies by province, 1998 and 2002, Ecuador
Province
Azuay
Bolivar
Cotopaxi
Chimborazo
Imbabura
Morona Santiago
Napo
Pastaza
Pichincha
Sucumbios
Zamora Chinchipe

% Ind.

98% Elected

5.9
28.4
27.9
49.3
39.6
25.5
24.5
46.9
9.4
11.7
2.7

18.3
19.0
9.3
7.6
16.1
27.8
24.5
24.4
10.6
0
10.6

Alliance
MUPP/PS-F A/ID

'1

none
none

--./

MUPP/PS-FA

'1
'1
'1
'1

MUPP/PS-FA/MCNP

none
none
MUPP/DP
MUPP/PS-FA/MCNP

02 %

11.1
15.3
14.9
22.8
16.8
23.0
21.9
15.75
11.8
14.55
36.85

Elected

'1
'1
'1

Alliance
MUPP/PSP

none
none

--./

MUPP/PSP

--./

none
none
none
none

--./
--./
--./

'1

MUPP/PSP
MUPP/MCNP
MUPPIPS-FA

MUPP /PS-FA/ID
-'1'1
Source 98 %: Beck, Scott, and Kenneth Mijeski.2001. "Barricades and Ballots: Ecuador's Indians and the
Pachakutik Political Movement." Ecuadorian Studies/Estudios ecuatorianos 1 (Sept.).
Source 02 %: TSE (Tribunal Supremo Electoral), 2004.

MUPP: Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais
PS-FA: Partido Socialista Ecuartoriano - Frente Amplio
ID: Izquierda Democratica
MCNP: Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais
DP: Democracia Popular
PSP: Partido Sociedad Patri6tica 21 de Enero
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CHAPTER 3: List-PR Electoral Systems and the Lack of Indigenous
Representation: The Outlier Peru

Introduction
Peru is the Andean country with the largest indigenous population in absolute
terms. Proportionally, a majority of the overall inhabitants are of indigenous origin
(estimates range from 40 to 45 percent). However, the native people in this country have
faced discrimination and injustice as the indigenous in Bolivia, Ecuador, and elsewhere;
but they also have been, until this day, almost entirely excluded from the political
processes in the country. No indigenous movement has yet developed at the national
level; indigenous municipal and provincial electoral successes are minimal compared to
the other nations in this study. The country's political and judicial systems have been
plagued with corruption, trust in governmental institutions and political parties is very
low (Schmidt 2004). Most recently, Cirilo Robles, the elected mayor ofLlave, a small
town in the Peruvian highlands, was attacked and lynched by the town's people for
corruption. The mayor himself, as well as the majority of the attackers, was of indigenous
decent (Shifter 2004). This is an example of the lack of legitimate, functioning channels
within the political system to address fraud and resolve disputes, particularly for
indigenous people that have yet to gain access to the main lawmaking and governing
bodies.
While many factors may have played a role in the development of this situation, I
will look at the national electoral system in this analysis. I hypothesize that the Peruvian
open-list Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system has helped prevent
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indigenous political representation at the national level, by discouraging the evolution of
indigenous movements and parties, as well as by giving the non-indigenous population
concentrated in the coastal region an electoral advantage over the indigenous voters in the
high- and lowland districts.
The dependent variable is political representation. In the previous two chapters, I
have attempted to measure representation in terms of the number of deputies elected to
the legislature, as well as in terms of their functionality at representing indigenous
interests. In the Peruvian case, I will not be able to apply this latter question of how well
deputies channel indigenous demands, since no members of native factions have been
elected to the national legislature.
Rather, I will look at the influence that the national electoral system (the main
independent variable) potentially had on the lack of indigenous movement evolution in
the past, as well as the impact it may have on the formation and institutionalization of
future indigenous factions. I specifically look at the Double Optional Preferential Vote,
seat allocation, and district magnitude. Furthermore, I consider the regional electoral
system as well as voter turnout in the latest national and regional elections, as these
factors may indicate the potential of future development of stable, institutionalized
indigenous factions, as the latter tend to commence their development at the local level,
as we have witnessed in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador.
Debates in the Literature
There is a general theme in the literature concerning Peruvian indigenous peoples:
the country is home to the least developed and least successful indigenous movements in
the Andean region (Van Cott 2003a, 2004; Schmidt 2004a, Dean 2002). This may be an
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implication why indigenous success at gaining representation at the national level has
been virtually non-existent to this day, especially as we have witnessed the formation of
indigenous parties out of movements in neighboring countries such as Ecuador and
Bolivia.
It seems that, overall, political institutions (particularly parties) in Peru have been

weak, unstable, and undeveloped throughout the country's recent history, which in turn
has contributed to political volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Payne et al. 2002,
Schmidt 2004a). The same can be said about mobilization and civil society at the
national level, particularly in regards to indigenous peoples. A number of authors have
looked at different factors such as the political history and geopolitical as well as socioeconomic characteristics of the country, in search of the roots of this condition. I will
discuss a number of their findings in the following section.
Peru is geographically divided into coastal, highland (Sierra) and lowland
(Amazonian) areas. While the coastal region only spreads out over one tenth of the total
territory, it is home to half of the country's population. Traditionally, elites have settled
in this area in and around the capital Lima, the center of politics and economics. About
one third of the country's population live in the highland areas, and one seventh in the
Amazon, the two regions where the majority of indigenous people is at home. The
cultural and economic differences between the three areas are rather pronounced; the
latter two regions are considered backwards and underdeveloped. The distant location of
Peru's capital from the highland and lowland reinforces the idea of separation, and has
made large-scale mobilization of the indigenous more difficult, since their access to the
center of politics is limited (Gelles 2002).
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Great differences can also be found between the highland and lowland indigenous
peoples, not only in terms of population size, tradition, and language, but also in terms of
how they live together. Most indigenous living in the sierra are campesinos, or peasants,
and are part of extensive peasant communities. Amazonian indigenous are home in the
jungle, the majority living in very traditional, native, if not primitive societies.
Amazonian natives belong to a diverse number of tribes that are rather isolated,
where the highlanders are mostly of Quechua and Aymara origin (Gelles 2002). These
disparities have encouraged a mood of isolation and fragmentation between the different
indigenous groups, rather than fostering a feeling of community. The profound
regionalism is also reflected in the indigenous organizations that do exist, such as the
Asociaci6n Interetnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) and the
Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades Amaz6nicas del Peru (CONAP). Both organizations
are based in the Amazon, share common interests, but are competing with each other
rather than working together (Dean 2002). It is not surprising, then, that indigenous
movements and organizations who rival each other do not seem to be able to reach
beyond the local level, be it within or outside of the political system. As Schmidt (2004a,
66) observes: " ... civil society among the poor is dense but disarticulated and largely
incapable of pursuing collective goals beyond the local level on a sustained basis." This
is not to argue that indigenous should shed the way they define themselves, rather that it
may be more beneficial for the advancement of their common interests to combine rather
than rival each other's political voice and capabilities.
Another factor often discussed in the literature with regards to the lack of national
indigenous political mobilization in Peru is the "reign" of President Fujimori from 1990
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to 2000. While his administration did create a couple of offices concerned with
indigenous affairs and laid a foundation for the potential future concession of Indian
rights, they did not achieve much in terms of indigenous advocacy under his rule. 1
Furthermore, Fujimori's neo-liberal approach to economic development turned out to be
detrimental to indigenous peoples. This happened particularly in the Amazon where the
extraction of natural resources (i.e. oil, natural gas) helped split up indigenous lands and
furthered the destruction of their environment (Dean 2002). This may then have added to
the lack of consolidation between indigenous peoples i.e. in the Amazon region, since it
exacerbated their groups' isolation from one another; and further undermined their trust
in political institutions as they continued to fail them.
This last point is also discussed by Schmidt (2004a), who finds that Fujimori's
dissolution, ridicule, and re-establishment of Congress as a rubber-stamp institution sent
out the message that public institutions such as legislatures and parties cannot be
confided in. The former president gave some money to the poor indigenous in exchange
for support, but failed to help the creation of intra-systemic channels for the
representation and communication of indigenous demands (Dean 2002, Schmidt 2004a).
Fujimori 's governance then may have hindered the development of stronger mobilization
and civil society amongst indigenous peoples by weakening their ties with each other,
confirming their low trust in political institutions, and giving them extra-systemic
incentives rather than supporting intra-systemic development of political channels for
demand aggregation and redistribution.
Sendero Luminoso (SL), or the Shining Path movement, which was spreading
political violence throughout Peru for well over a decade after 1980, has also been
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credited with further contributing to a low level of indigenous mobilization by a variety
of authors. Tens of thousands of people died during the active period of SL, many of
them indigenous (Schmidt 2004a). The guerillas were particularly active in the tropical
Andes and the Amazon, both heavily populated by indigenous people, who were
automatically drawn into the conflict, forced to pick sides (Dean 2002). The Peruvian
government soon launched a counterattack against SL, which included the militarization
of the "rondas campesinas", which were peasant self-defense groups that evolved in the
late 1970s (Dean 2002, Schmidt 2004a, Fajardo 2002). These groups were initially the
most dynamic peasant movement in the 1980s, playing a great role in conflict mediation
and addressing problems that were ignored by the national government (Fajardo 2002).
They were potentially providing the base for a greater peasant mobilization in the future,
which did not become a reality due to the counterinsurgency effort. As Fajardo (2002)
notes, the attempt to reconstruct a peasant movement would be a drawn-out process,
particularly under the conditions of poverty and military control.
Moreover, other authors look for reasons more within the structure of Peruvian
politics and society. Degregori (1999), for example, argues that the term "indio" has a
negative connotation historically, and is used for the poor strata of society (indigenous,
slaves, poor farmers). No one today wants to be identified as an "indio", which has
helped prevent the evolution of social movements based on ethnicity. Furthermore, also
making ethnically-based mobilization less likely, highland indigenous are identified by
their social-economic status as peasants rather than by their ethnicity (Gelles 2002).
Finally, the style of indigenous politics itself may be a decisive factor as well.
Broad consensus at the community level rather than detached, centralized, authoritarian
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politics should be the political ideals to follow (Morin and Saladin d' Anglure 1997). The
problem with today's pan-ethnic politics, according to Dean and Levi (2003), Kearney
(1996), and Smith (1996), is their personalized orientation and top-down approach,
without much regard for grass-root activism. As we have observed in Bolivia and
Ecuador, successful indigenous movements and parties are generally built from the
bottom up.
There are a number of authors that evaluate parts of the Peruvian electoral system
in its past and present format, yet not in terms of its effect on indigenous factions.
Schmidt (2004), for example, argues that the way candidates are chosen by the voters
(Double Optional Preferential Vote or DOPV) encourages competition and therefore
fragmentation within parties. According to the author, the DOPV is an error prone and
fraud-prone process, since electoral authorities do not watch it as closely. Katz (1980)
adds that political parties, when intra-party choice is allowed, as is the case under DOPV,
tend to be rather disunited and personalistic. Local elections have also received some
attention: Andrianzen et al. (2002) analyze the outcome of the 2002 regional election and
found that parties are polarized, and political representation is fragmented. Independent
candidates won a good part of the Sierra, and many candidates were elected with a low
percentage of the vote (around 30 percent), making their credibility questionable. In
essence, the main message this seems to convey is that voters are not satisfied with the
way things are, yet are not sure which direction they want to change to. At the very least,
absenteeism at these regional elections was relatively low at fifteen percent (Andrianzen
et al. 2002), potentially demonstrating that Peruvians want to participate in their political
processes.
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I hope to add to the existing scholarship by looking at the potential relationship of
the electoral system to the lack of indigenous factions and political representation in Peru.

Data and Methodology
In my analysis, I consider the electoral system for the legislative branch of
government, the national Congress. Made up of 130 members from all regions of the
country, this institution should theoretically provide the most space for the articulation of
diverse interests at the national level.
In contrast with the previous two cases (Bolivia and Ecuador), no indigenous
movement or political organization has been successful at national level elections in Peru.
However, the nature of the electoral system may have contributed to this situation. I will
therefore consider the two most recent elections in 2000 and 2001, and evaluate the
theoretical implications of the electoral systems used in both years. A comparison of
factors such as district magnitude, list type, vote type, seat allocation and seat allocation
formula should shed some light on the potentially positive or negative effects the
electoral system could bear on indigenous party formation and success. I chose the 2000
and 2001 elections since they were the most recent national-level elections. One may
argue that the 2000 elections may have been undermined by fraud since Fujimori ran for
an unconstitutional third term in the simultaneously occurring presidential elections, and
this could potentially have skewed results in the legislature as well. However, I am not
looking at the presidential elections in this analysis, and legislative elections were held in
a constitutional manner. Furthermore, it would not make sense to compare the latest
election in 2001 with an election that was not its immediate predecessor, as to note the
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latest changes in the electoral system, and the most contemporary trends in regards to
indigenous political representation.
To make this analysis more realistic and far-reaching, I will also look at the
electoral system used in the 2002 regional elections, where indigenous movements indeed
have had some local success. While I do not have access to data that reveals whether a
movement or political faction is primarily centered on indigenous identity or ethnicity,
the electoral system structure itself may imply whether it could foster the development of
indigenous factions. I will finally consider registration requirements for political
movements and parties to be eligible to compete in the election, as they can impact the
ability of an indigenous faction to form and be electorally viable (Bimir forthcoming).
Electoral results for both the national and regional elections were obtained from a variety
of sources: the governmental institutions Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales
(ONPE) and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informcitica (INEI), the national
organization Participa Peru, the Base de Datos Politicos de la Americas, and media
outlets such as CNN. The same information was obtained from all sources considered,
giving the results used here more credibility.
In the two parts of the analysis described above, I will control for the size of the
indigenous population by district (see Table 3.1). There is no census data available on the
number of indigenous people in this country, since this characteristic was last used in the
1940 census. At that time, 46 percent of all Peruvians were classified as indigenous,
mostly of Quechuan and Aymaran origin (Schmidt, 2004). I will therefore consider
alternative sources, such as the atlas and database about indigenous populations in the
Amazon (Brack Egg and Yufioz 1997), data from the Asociaci6n Interetnica de
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Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), and the classification of indigenous districts
by other scholars such as Binir (2001 ). While it is difficult to determine the exact
number of indigenous inhabitants of a district, it is also not necessary for this type of
analysis. Since no representatives of indigenous factions were elected into the national
Congress, and an undetermined number into regional government, the question of where
these deputies were not elected is redundant. An approximate indication of where
indigenous people are concentrated, however, will help in the process of evaluating
where the potential would be given that indigenous factions could be elected in the
future. I will define "indigenous districts" as those which are home to a significant
number of indigenous people according to linguistic groups (in the Amazon I Selva), and
geographical location (southern and central highlands in the Sierra).
The differentiation of indigenous versus non-indigenous districts will find
application in the evaluation of voter turnout at the district level. I will consider voter
turnout in the national 2000 and 2001 elections, as well as in the regional 2002 elections.
The prospects of future indigenous party success could be affected by turnout, as voting
is the critical component for electoral success. I will then argue that if a change in turnout
can be observed in indigenous districts, it could be an indication of the level of electoral
support future indigenous factions could receive, as an increase or decrease in overall
voter turnout per district may be an indicator of the level of political activism, including
indigenous political activism. The values for turnout are based on district level election
data from Dr. Gregory Schmidt (2000) and district level data from the ONPE and the
INEI. I calculated the approximate turnout by dividing the number of actual votes taken
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(including valid, nulled, and blank ballots) by the number of all registered and eligible
voters in the district.
Finally, I will consider factors outside of the electoral system that may have
contributed to the lack of national level electoral success by indigenous movements and
parties. Some of these have been addressed more extensively in the literature, as the
foregoing section has shown. It is important to look at the overall picture to evaluate any
trends in the development of indigenous political actors. I will then try to discuss the
potential of indigenous faction formation and electoral success based on the experiences
of such movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, where they have been more successful. In
highlighting the differences and similarities between the three countries and their
movements, I hope to be able to make some projections about the political future of
indigenous peoples in Peru.
Results and Discussion
National Elections
The electoral systems used in the 2000 and 2001 congressional elections are
similar in many respects, as can be seen in the following table. The two main similar
characteristics that need to be considered are the vote type and the way seats are
allocated, since these two factors have a great impact on who gets a seat in the legislature,
which ultimately impacts the way candidates within parties relate to each other, in tum
shaping party structures. The Double Optional Preferential Vote (DOPV) lets the voter
select two candidates from his chosen list that he would prefer to be given seats in the
legislature. Each list receives a number of seats proportional to its share of the vote, and
the preferential votes decide which candidates receive a seat (Schmidt 2004aa).
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I argue that this way of selecting congressional deputies could have a negative impact on
the successful formation and institutionalization of political parties, particularly smaller
ones (future indigenous factions will most likely fit in this category). By being able to
pick and chose between different candidates within a party, the voter encourages these
candidates to compete with each other in hopes of attracting enough individual
preferential votes to get one of the faction's seats (Schmidt 2004a). It therefore fosters
personalistic, individual-focused voter choice rather than aiming at support for the party
and its platform as a whole. Political parties therefore tend to be disunited (Katz 1980).
As we have seen in Bolivia and Ecuador, an environment of rivaling candidates
within a party is not supportive of the evolution of stable, institutionalized parties. The
opposite is true: competition rather than cohesion within a party may even lead to the
splintering away of leaders to pursue their personal political goals, further weakening a
party's internal structure and support base. The characteristic of proportional
representation (PR) systems to encourage many small factions to compete in an election
furthers the fragmenting effects of DOPV, since it promises possible electoral success to
those who split away, rather than forcing them to consolidate their differences within one
faction if they hope to attain any seats.
It is difficult to estimate the actual impact of the DOPV on non-indigenous parties
that ran in the 2000 and 2001 elections, because of the circumstances that surrounded the
two races. 2 I will content, however, based on the theoretical implications explained
above, that if indigenous political movements would participate in future congressional
elections, they would most likely also be affected by the fragmenting effects the DOPV
can have on parties. Furthermore, I argue that this fragmentation and the access even very
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small parties have to the political field could impede a future indigenous political
movement's ability to represent indigenous demands in Congress: if cohesion within such
an indigenous movement is less likely, their numbers of seats will most likely be too
small to have any impact on decision making in Congress, due to splintering within their
faction. Finally, how likely are candidates to work together that rival each other for
preferential votes? Based on the assumptions explained above, I argue not very likely.
On a related note, the DOPV seems to be more susceptible to fraud: election
authorities do not watch the allocation of seats within parties as closely; this is the
parties' responsibility (Schmidt 2004). Some factions may then chose someone different
to receive a seat than what the voters indicated through their preferential vote. Also,
studies have shown that poorer voters are less likely to use DOPV (meaning they will not
indicate a preference), and when they do they are more error-prone (Schmidt 2004). This
could potentially have a negative effect on indigenous voters since they generally belong
to the poorest strata of society, and are therefore more likely to make mistakes filling out
their ballots, leaving a higher number of the latter ones invalid and therefore unable to
influence the electoral outcome.
After considering some of the similar characteristics of the 2000 and 2001
electoral systems, I will now tum to the most striking difference between them: district
numbers and magnitudes. The 2000 elections were held in a single national district,
where in 2001 deputies were elected in 25 multi-member districts with district
magnitudes varying from one to 35. The general argument in the social sciences is that
the larger the district magnitude in a PR system, the more proportional the results will be.
(Katz 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989).
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Electoral Systems National Congress Peru: 2000 and 2001
2000
2001
Total number of deputies
120
120
List type
open
open
Vote type
DOPV
Double Optional
Preferential Vote (DOPV):
in addition to selecting a
list, voter can also select
two preferential candidates
on the list (do not have to
be ordinal)
Seat allocation
Each list is awarded seats in Each list is awarded seats in
proportion to its share of
proportion to its share of
votes, specific candidates
votes, specific candidates
are elected by preferential
are elected by preferential
votes
votes
D'Hondt
D'Hondt
Allocation formula
Electoral Districts
1
25
Average District Maimitude 120
4.84 (3.44)*
*The district of Lima presents an outlier with a district magnitude (dm) of 35 (the next
highest dm is 7); the value in parenthesis therefore shows the average district magnitude
without Lima.
Sources: Schmidt 2004a; Congreso Peruana (http://www.congreso.gob.pe)

Based on this assumption, one may argue that under the 2000 electoral system,
small indigenous movements would have had a better chance at gaining seats. However,
we also need to consider the impact such a district magnitude could have on the
formation and viability of such factions, which logically have to precede their electoral
success (a faction cannot be elected if it is not formed or viable, meaning able to garner a
substantial number of votes). A very large district magnitude theoretically allows for
many small factions to enter the political stage. This then, combined with the fragmenting
effects ofDOPV, further discourages the consolidation, institutionalization, and internal
cohesiveness small parties need to obtain enough votes to secure seats in the legislature.
One may argue that thanks to such a large district magnitude, regionally concentrated
minorities (such as different indigenous tribes) could gain access to representation in the
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legislature. However, registration requirements for parties and movements in the 2000
elections may dampen this argument in that inscription in the national election authority
required the signature of at least 4 percent of the national electorate, and by 2000
Fujimori had raised this standard to almost 500,000 people (Schmidt 2004a, Lopez 2000).
Considering, for example, that the total of indigenous peoples in the Amazon region is
only about 250,000, Amazonian Indians could not get to this number by themselves. The
highland indigenous, as I will discuss later on, are much more numerous, yet organized
along class lines and very much separate from the Amazonian indigenous; help from the
highlanders therefore could not be expected. Based on these notions, it seems that the
large national district encouraged internal party fragmentation, and along with inflated
party registration requirements denied smaller parties with a geographically concentrated
constituency the chance to succeed in national elections. Indigenous movements, if they
existed at the time, would have faced the challenges of registration requirements along
with a risk of internal fragmentation, suggesting that the DOPV and the single national
district helped maintain the status quo of no national-level representation of indigenous
factions.
One may now argue that things should have improved due to the use of smaller,
more numerous districts during the 2001 elections. However, small districts are usually
argued to discourage proportionality, since they provide access to the political stage for
smaller number of actors/parties (Katz 1980, 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). It may
appear somewhat contradictory to argue against large and small districts, yet the negative
implications of a very large district in conjunction with registration requirements in Peru
have been explained above. I am not arguing against the commonly accepted notion that

84

larger districts make representation more proportional, I am arguing however that in the
case of Peru's electoral system with DOPV and registration requirements, the single
national district has encouraged fragmentation and therefore may have helped to prevent
smaller, possibly indigenous factions, from achieving enough stability to be electorally
viable. It could then be argued that very small districts may discourage party
fragmentation, yet may give larger parties an advantage over smaller competitors, as the
former would most likely be able to gamer greater support. With only a small number of
seats to contest, the amount of votes needed to secure one of those seats increases, while
chances for small parties decrease. If indigenous factions were to participate in national
electoral races in the future, they would most likely start out as a small political force,
and could therefore be disadvantaged by smaller district size.
Let us then tum to Table 3 .2, showing district magnitudes for the 2001 elections.
I will consider the values for average district magnitude without Lima, since this district
is an outlier and could skew the results in favor of my argument. I differentiate between
indigenous people in the Amazon and Sierra regions, as they are inherently dissimilar as
will be discussed later on. The average district magnitude should be an indicator of how
likely it is for smaller factions (potentially indigenous political movements in the future)
to win seats in the legislature. As the table suggests, indigenous people in the Amazon
are the least likely to gain representation, followed by the indigenous people in the Sierra.
It then seems, solely by the consideration of district magnitude, that if indigenous people

had viable political organizations to channel their demands and participate in the
legislative process, these organizations would be much less likely to achieve
representation in Congress. Furthermore, having a small district magnitude in districts
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with indigenous populations could be part of the explanation why viable electoral
vehicles have not yet formed: they seem to have little chance at electoral success when
competing with larger, established factions.
When looking at Table 3 .2, it is easy to notice that Lima has an immediate
advantage over all other districts, with a district magnitude of 35. The capital then sends
one quarter of the nation's representatives to Congress, giving the district immense
leverage in decision-making processes. In comparison, all eleven indigenous districts
combined send 34 representatives to Congress, and all non-indigenous districts less Lima
send 51 deputies to Congress. Overall then, non-indigenous districts combined send 86
deputies to Congress, giving them 72 percent of the vote in the legislature. These
districts are located in the coastal region, demonstrating well the large difference in
political influence between the "Costa" and the rest of the country (which is where
indigenous people ultimately live). This concentration of power on the coast has been
credited as being one of the factors that is responsible for the lack of indigenous access to
political resources, being very distanced from the center of action.
Overall then, the electoral systems used in the 2000 and 2001 elections do not
seem to have been supportive of the evolvement and/or institutionalization of indigenous
political vehicles. They could be partially responsible for the fact that no indigenous
faction has yet won representation in the national legislature.
Regional Elections
As the implications of the national electoral system are difficult to test in regards
to indigenous movements (since none have succeeded), I turn to elections for the regional
administrative level. These elections were implemented in Peru in 2002, in an effort to
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decentralize power structures. Each region is considered an electoral district, and voters
elect a regional President, Vice-President, and regional council for tenure of four years.
The number of members on the regional council equals the number of provinces within a
district, therefore a minimum of seven, one from each province. The voters chose
between closed lists, which can be made up of candidates from one party or from
alliances between different factions. The President and Vice-President come from the list
that gains the majority of votes, so does the majority of council members (at least half
plus one seats are allocated to the winning list). The remaining seats are distributed
among the remaining lists, according to the distribution formula.
A number of factors need to be considered here. On a positive note, closed lists
encourage those on the list to work together, as the list that receives the largest number of
votes is rewarded over-proportionally (i.e. even when a list wins with only 30 percent of
the vote, it still gets more than 50 percent of the representation on the regional council
plus the presidency and vice-presidency). This may then be positive for smaller factions
as internal cohesion is encouraged, helping them to stabilize. Indigenous factions that
could be electorally successful seem more likely to form under this electoral system, as it
discourages rivalry among candidates from one list, giving small factions a chance to
become unified and learn to bargain within their party rather than splitting away.
Indigenous factions that have a locally concentrated supporter base could benefit
substantially from even a small victory margin under this system, as long as they receive
the majority of votes. However, they could also be disproportionally disadvantaged if an
indigenous movement lost to another faction by a small margin, as the other faction
would be overcompensated. Overall then, under this type of system, small factions with
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a locally concentrated supporter base have a good chance to become electorally viable (at
least at the regional level), and to gain access to representation in the regional council.
In considering the outcomes of the 2002 elections it is noteworthy that a number
of political movements that do not belong to the traditionally successful political parties
have succeeded at gaining seats in regional councils. While the Partido Aprista Peruano
(PAP), the oldest and most institutionalized party in Peru, gained the majority in thirteen
of 25 districts, local movements took the lead in seven other districts (five of which are
indigenous districts). As I am interested in indigenous representation, I focus on
indigenous districts. Table 3.3 shows political movements that were successful in
indigenous districts. For example, in Ucayali non-national factions won all but one seat
in the regional council. What this indicates is that at the local level, under the regional
electoral system, smaller factions indeed may have a good chance to gain access to the
regional council, giving them an entry point into politics. This could have a positive
effect on indigenous mobilization, encouraging Indian political organization at the local
level.
As indicated in Table 3.3, some of the already regionally successful political
movements may indeed be indigenous- based. It is difficult to determine whether a
movement just bears an indigenous name or symbol or is actually organized around
ethnicity. The movements indicated as possibly being indigenous in Table 3.4 possess an
identifying element in their name, either a theme, region, or symbol that is identified with
indigenous ethnicity. However, it may be just that: a symbol or gesture to garner
indigenous support. Information on the hundreds of small movements in Peru is hardly
accessible. Gregory Schmidt (2004b), a political scientist specializing in Peruvian and
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Peruvian-indigenous politics, also contents that many groups may identify themselves as
"cholos", or individuals with indigenous roots, yet would not be "self-consciously
indigenous movements". 3 The only exception to this would be in the Amazon region,
since people there identify themselves as natives, or indigenous. The "possibly
indigenous" movement in Table 3.3 that is labeled Amazon is therefore most likely
organized around ethnic identity.
I will then argue that indigenous movements seem to have had some success in
regional elections, possibly indicating that there is a chance for them to eventually move
up to the national level. How this advancement would be possible, however, is another
question. As the regional electoral system tends to encourage intra-faction unification,
the national electoral system seems to discourage it. Furthermore, many movements
successful at the local level are organized around local identity and context, which may
give them a disadvantage if they want to expand their support base to the national level.
Regionalism generally does not produce solid political movements, as they are unable to
expand beyond regional identity and supporter base. If we then look at the factions that
won the majority of regional seats in Huanuco, Junin, and Loreto, we notice that their
names reveal strong regional identity (i.e. "Fight for Huanuco", United for Junin ... ,
United for Loreto ... ). Even if these districts were to elect such factions to the national
Congress, their influence on the legislative process would most likely be minimal, with
those districts entertaining a rather small district magnitude.
Finally, the overall role ofregional governments needs to be taken into
consideration. While the return to local level government indicates the beginnings of
decentralization (which should theoretically help marginalized sectors gain political
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representation), the regional government's powers and duties are as of yet relatively illdefined (Andrianzen et al. 2002). Furthermore, regional governments depend on the
national government for fiscal support, and are therefore rather weak and possess little
political leverage (Schmidt 2004aa). How much importance can we then attribute to the
political movement success at the regional level? It seems that there may be room for
better definition of the regional governments' role possibly leading to increased political
power in the future, as they are still in their initial phase of operation (they came into
existence in 2003 ). Thus, from this angle, political success at the local level may then be
the first step towards changes in the national arena. Regional politics also often provide
grounds for political recruitment, but so far this has only happened in the larger Peruvian
cities (Schmidt 2004a). Recruitment from the rural indigenous regions is, at this point,
less likely to occur, since there is no overarching national indigenous movement.
Overall, the success of smaller political movements (some indigenous based) at
the regional level should be seen as positive, as it seems to give these factions some
involvement in decision-making processes, seems to encourage intra-party bargaining
and consolidation, and could provide hands-on political training to party representatives
that strive to eventually become successful in national elections. However, given the
limitations of regional government influence at the national level, as well as the potential
difficulties related to the differences in the regional and national electoral systems and
political movement orientations (as discussed above), we should be careful not to
attribute too much significance to these developments, as indigenous people are still far
from having any political influence on national legislative processes.
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Voter Turnout
An essential indicator of political activism, voter turnout could help reveal what level of
support indigenous factions may be able to receive in the future. In a comparison between
the two national elections of 2000 and 2001 and the regional election of2002 I hope to be
able to observe a trend towards or away from greater political participation.
Table 3.4 reveals turnout levels from the three elections mentioned above, as well
as a categorization of district size, which I use to determine whether there is a trend
observable in indigenous districts related to the scope of the electorate. The majority of
electoral districts have between 30,000 and 870,000 eligible voters (only one is
significantly larger: Lima with an electorate of 5,066,395). I therefore apply the labels
small (S), medium (M), large (L), and extra-large (XL) in 200,000 voter increments,
arguing that this categorization proportionally divides districts into comparable units
(comparable by size).
Voting is mandatory for all Peruvian citizens between 18 and 70 years of age.
This may explain in part why the percentages for voter turnout are relatively high.
However, if we look at the turnout rates for 1990 and 1995 (68.4 and 63.4 percent,
respectively), when mandatory voting was also in place, in comparison with 2000 and
2001 (82.3 and 79.1 percent, respectively), we notice that political participation seems to
have increased significantly (IDEA 2004). While many other factors, such as fear of SL
attacks to polling stations, may have affected voter turnout in the 1990s, the observation
of a steep increase in turnout shows that mandatory voting is not the only issue
influencing how many people go to the polls. The level of interest in political
participation may therefore be a factor as well.
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Overall voter turnout between 2000 and 2001 dropped by an average of 3.2
percent. This can be explained in part by growing voter apathy, since Fujimori's third run
for the presidency was unconstitutional and his rubber-stamp legislature had 'interpreted'
the law in Fujimori's favor, further compromising its own legitimacy. The campaign for
the 2001 elections was also often overtaken by the revelation of many outrages from the
Fujimori period (Schmidt 2003), causing the election to receive less public attention.
Another factor that needs to be considered is what I call "election-fatigue": after going to
the polls less than a year earlier, voters may have felt less compelled to voice their
preference for a leader again in such a short time period, especially considering the
scandals they witnessed shortly after the last election. These outrages may have very well
further compromised the public's trust in government and therefore discouraged them
from voting.
The 2002 regional elections paint a different picture. Overall voter turnout
increased by 3.52 percent, in districts such as Amazonas and Loreto even seven percent
more ballots were cast than in the previous year at the national level. How could these
differences be explained? Voters may have felt less distanced from a regional
government than the national government. As discussed in a previous section, many
smaller parties and independent political movements were able to compete at the regional
level, giving voters more choices. These smaller movements may have been more
successful at pulling together local votes, promising a break from larger factions that
have not fulfilled voter's expectations in the past. Regional elections, as they were not
held under Fujimori, also seem to be less "tainted" by his legacy, making them more
appealing to the masses that suffered under his regime.
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In examining turnout closer, it is noticeable that the fluctuation in voter turnout
over the three years is greater in indigenous districts than in the coastal regions. From
2000 to 2001, voter turnout in districts where indigenous people are concentrated
decreased by 3.81 percent, compared to the non-native districts where it fell by 2.85
percent. The difference is even greater in 2002: turnout increased in indigenous districts
by 4.45 percent, in coastal regions by 2.62 percent. 4 District size may be an explanatory
factor: In a smaller district the overall percentage of voter turnout may change if even a
small number of voters are added or subtracted from the total. Let me explain this with a
simple example: If district A has 1OOO eligible voters, and district B has 100 eligible
voters, and 50 people do not show up to cast their ballot in either district, the effect on
district B is much larger than on district A (turnout would be 50 percent and 95 percent,
respectively). Thus, since more than 70 percent of indigenous districts in Peru are small
or medium sized, and 54 percent of non-indigenous districts have a large or extra-large
electorate, results could have been affected just by the number of eligible voters in each
region (see Table 3.4).
However, I argue that an increase in turnout of an average 4.45 percent (in two
indigenous districts even seven percent) is too large to be attributed only to district size. I
argue that such an increase could have been propelled by a rise in political activism in the
highland and Amazon regions, which could mean an increase in indigenous political
activism. As I have discussed earlier, some factions participated and succeeded in the
elections under an indigenous label, possibly aiming their campaign at the indigenous
vote. While it is hard to assess whether this was done merely to tap another source of
votes or in order to represent indigenous interests, the targeting of indigenous symbols
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seems to have had at least a small positive effect on indigenous political participation.
While it is clear that what I label as indigenous districts are not territories inhabited solely
by native peoples, the latter are indeed part of the electorate. The fact that districts with a
large proportion of indigenous inhabitants such as Amazonas, Cajamarca, and Loreto
have had an increase in voter turnout of seven, six, and seven percent respectively
confirms this notion, as it is unlikely that the non-indigenous segments of these regions
alone brought about such a large change.
What may this mean for indigenous representation in Peru? An increase in
indigenous political participation may eventually lead to the formation of indigenous
based movements or factions, as they may find a broader support base. Political activism
may also increase communication among the indigenous, as different groups become
more involved in the political process. Communication then may lead to greater
coalescence, as different factions may realize that their goals are more similar than
different. While this may seem far-fetched, it is not entirely removed from reality:
Looking at the different tribes in the Amazon region for example, the outsider may easily
notice that the problems are similar for most of them: the extractive industry (particularly
for hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas) is destroying their habitats, disturbances in
indigenous communities are also caused by the state's counter-narcotics efforts (Dean
2002). Due to isolation and traditional conflicts not visible to the outsider, the different
groups do not work together. If they are forced to interact with each other, for example in
the political arena, they may realize that coalescence is much more effective a tool to
reach common goals than competition. Indigenous movements in either Ecuador or
Bolivia were not politically successful until they began working together. To explore the
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potential for this to happen in Peru, I now focus my discussion on some of the factors that
have been said to be responsible for the lack of a national level indigenous movement,
and compare them with the situation in Bolivia and Ecuador.
Prospects for Indigenous Political Mobilization
Table 3.5 shows a summary of how different factors affecting indigenous
mobilization compare in the three Andean countries that are subject of this study. At first
glance it seems that Ecuador and Peru are very different (in terms of these factors), and
that Bolivia has similarities with both countries. These differences and similarities may
then further highlight some of the difficulties indigenous groups in Peru will face and
need to overcome to become more successful in terms of organization and political
participation. It also illustrates that these obstacles are not insurmountable, since in a
country like Bolivia (that has experienced political upheaval, extreme instability, and a
division between high-and lowland indigenous peoples just like Peru) indigenous factions
are slowly gaining more political influence.
It seems that the main factor preventing indigenous mobilization in Peru is the

reluctance to self-identify as indigenous people. The traditionally negative connotation
that the label "indio" has carried for centuries was further reinforced in recent history, for
example through the organization of Sendero Luminoso around indigenous identity, and
the disregard of rights granted to indigenous communities by the Fujimori regime and the
extractive industry (i.e. land titling and community rights). The latter reinforced the
notion that indigenous people's rights are existent on paper but can be trampled if it
benefits those in power, maybe because natives are generally seen as weak and
backwards. The stigma that is associated with being a native, however, could become less
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intense if political visibility and influence of indigenous groups rises; such as it has in
Bolivia and Ecuador. The ones that need to overcome the negativity of indigenous
identity first and foremost are the indigenous themselves: otherwise mobilization around
ethnicity is not likely to happen. While this may be a drawn out process (as we see in
Bolivia and Ecuador, even after decades of indigenous mobilization the stigma has
diminished but not disappeared), it is a necessary one if indigenous representation in
political processes is the goal.
The cholos in the cities may be key to such an effort: many of them are
rediscovering their native roots, and are following old traditions such as indigenous
festivities etc., while also partaking in the modem aspects of city life. While the majority
of them are poor and live in slums called "pueblos jovenes", conditions are slowly
improving as employment and housing are becoming more available (Harlowe, 2004).
This group may then serve as a link between the "hinterland" (Sierra and Amazon) and
the center of politics, as they most likely will have better access to education and political
resources than those indigenous living in locations remote from the urban centers of
political and social activity.
Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador faced divisions and conflict in
their early stages, and as they grew larger and more competitive they were finally left
with the option to coalesce and grow to the national level, or to stall at their current stage
of success. The process of compromising and fusing different movements together was a
drawn out one, and is still going on to an extent. In Peru, there are seemingly no local
movements that have yet grown large enough to overstep the boundary into another
movement's territory in the attempt to expand their own constituency. Until that happens,
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there does not seem to be a necessity to cooperate with one another. If smaller indigenous
movements then can built on the limited success they have had in local elections, and
grow, they will eventually arrive at the point where they have to face another
movement's territory (especially considering the vast number oflocal movements in
Peru). At this point, if they are striving towards enlargement, they will have to coalesce.
Looking at the histories of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, it seems likely
that in Peru coalescence is possible, given the prevalence of the indigenous situation
(destruction of habitat, poverty, suppression etc.), an already existing indigenous identity
in the Amazon region, an emerging coca-growers' identity in the highlands (as in
Bolivia), local-level political success of some indigenous movements, and increasing ties
of indigenous communities to the political centers (through cholos). I would not argue
that coalescence would develop at a fast pace, but rather that there is the likelihood that it
would develop at all.

Conclusions
Over the past few Peruvian elections, we have witnessed some positive trends that
may eventually lead to a greater indigenous political representation in the future.
Increased voter turnout at regional elections, particularly in indigenous districts,
combined with some sub-national success of indigenous movements possibly propelled
by the regional electoral system's tendency to encourage intra-faction consolidation, may
give the impression that Peruvian indigenous political success will soon follow in the
footsteps of its neighbors Bolivia and Ecuador.
However, while the national electoral system in Bolivia and Ecuador has been
able to dampen the electoral success rate of indigenous factions in the countries'
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legislatures, the national electoral system in Peru may have more detrimental effects on
indigenous representation in the national Congress. The difference is that in Ecuador and
Bolivia indigenous mobilization and movements were well underway before the current
electoral systems were put in place, where in Peru electoral system reforms happened
before there was any national level indigenous organization or movement in place. The
potentially fragmenting effects of the DOPV, and the restricting impact of a small district
magnitude in indigenous districts therefore seems to have a graver impact in Peru, where
they could help prevent indigenous organizations from consolidation at the national level,
therefore possibly hindering their overall entrance onto the national political stage. While
there are signs that we should not "write off" indigenous political mobilization in Peru as
unlikely to happen (as discussed in the preceding section), this analysis shows that the
national electoral system may further complicate and prolong the process of national
indigenous political representation, even more so than in the neighboring Andean
countries.

1 Examples

of these offices are the Defensoria del Pueblo (a national Ombudsman defending human rights)
and the Ministerio de Promoci6n de la Mujer y de! Desarrollo Humano (PROMUDEH, designed to
improve indigenous people's welfare). For more information, see: Dean, Bartholomew. 2002. "State Power
and Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Amazonia: A Lost Decade, 1990-2000." In The Politics ofEthnicity:
Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States, ed. David Maybury-Lewis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press: 199-238.
2 The authoritarian leader Fujimori and his party (Peru 2000) ruled Peru for a decade, and the party's
decline following Fujimori's exit opened political space in which other parties (including smaller ones)
could compete. However, only one congressional election has passed since, and the shifts in party
composition in Congress between 2000 and 200 I would mostly be attributed to changing regime and power
structures, rather than to the DOPV or other components of the electoral system.
3 Cholos are refugees of indigenous origin who fled from the rural areas to the cities, particularly Lima.
Many of them tried to escape Sendero Luminoso's terror. The majority of them live in Pueblos Jovenes (or
shantytowns) in the outskirts of the city (Degregori 1999).
4 These estimates were calculated from Table 3.4 without the consideration of Lima, as to avoid the
comparison of dissimilar values. In the 2000 and 200 I elections, the electoral district of Lima included the
city itself and was made up of 5,066,395 voters, while the 2002 regional elections concerned only the
provincial part of the district (503,693 voters), excluding the city. Turnout therefore reflects a different
electorate in the national and regional elections.
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Table 3.1: Districts with an Indigenous Concentration, Peru.
El ectorate *
Reg10n
. ** I nd"1genous
Amazonas
165,589
A
~~
Ancash
595,791
c
Apurimac
184,655
s
Arequipa
697,456
c
Ayacucho
292,360
s
~
Cajamarca
638,285
s
~~
Callao
483,254
Cusco
599,712
s
~
Huancavelica
208,209
s
·::.;~
Huanuco
353,829
s
412,903
lea
c
Junin
673,114
s
~
La Libertad
863,245
c
Lambayeque
614,050
c
Lima
5,066,395
c
Loreto
371,138
A
~~
Madre de Dios
38,323
A
~~
Moquegua
89,802
c
Pasco
133,111
s
~
Piura
816,314
c
Puno
622,923
A
~
San Martin
308,717
A
~
Tacna
146,429
c
Tumbes
92,046
c
Ucayali
181,995
A
~..J
*This number is based on the registered voters in each district in the 2001 National
Elections.
** A=Amazon or Selva, S=Sierra (highlands), C=Coast
~ estimate based on geographical location
~..J estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yanez. Eds.
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades Jndigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas.
Lima: BIBLOS S.A.)
All estimates are compared with Birnir, Johanna. 2001. Party System Stabilization in New
Democracies: The Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Volatility of Electoral Preferences.
Ph.D. diss, University of California, Los Angeles: 191.
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Table 3.2: District Magnitude in the 2001 Peruvian National Legislative Elections.
D'1stnct
. N ame
D'1stnct
. M ag.
In d"1genous
,j--j
Amazonas
2
Ancash
5
Apurimac
2
Arequipa
5
.J
Avacucho
3
··:v.J
Caiamarca
5
Callao
4
Cusco
.J
5
Huancavelica
2
Huanuco
.Jl
3
lea
4
Junin
5
.J
La Libertad
7
Lambayeque
5
Lima
35
.J.J
Loreto
3
Madre de Dios
1
.J.J
Moquegua
2
Pasco
2
.J
Piura
6
Puno
5
.J
San Martin
3
Tacna
2
2
Tumbes
.J.J
Ucayali
2
Average District Magnitude
4.80
(3.55)*
(ADM)
2.67
ADM indizenous Amazon
ADM indif{enous Sierra
3.60
7.00
ADM non-indigenous
(4.2)*
*The district of Lima presents an outlier with a district magnitude (dm) of 35 (the next
highest dm is 7); the value in parenthesis therefore shows the average district magnitude
without Lima .
.J estimate based on geographical location (Amazon or Sierra)
.J.J estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yafiez. Eds.
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades lndigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas.
Lima: BIBLOS S.A.)
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Table 3.3: Political Movement Success in Indigenous Districts, Regional Elections,
2002, Peru
Movement
District (#of seats won)
Possibly indigenous?
Movimiento Independiente
Ayacucho ( 1)
Integraci6n Regional
Movimiento Democratico
Cusco (1)
Juntos Por el Progreso
Partido Inka Pachakuteq
Yes
Cusco (1)
Movimiento lndependiente
Huanuco (P, VP, 7)
"Luchemos por Huanuco"
Movimiento Popular
Huanuco (1)
Regional
Unidos por Junin Sierra y
Junin (P, VP, 6)
Selva
Movimiento Todos Por
Junin (1)
Junin
Unidos por Loreto-Unipol
Loreto (P, VP, 5)
Movimiento Independiente
Loreto (1)
Fuerza Loretana
Selva Sur
Madre de Dios (1)
Concertaci6n en la Region
Pasco (P, VP, 5)
por la Descentralizaci6n
Movimiento Independiente
Yes (Amazon)
San Martin (1)
Nueva Amazonia
U cayali (P, VP, 5)
Movimiento Independiente
Ucayali (1)
Integrando Ucayali
P=President, VP=Vice President
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Table 3.4: Voter Turnout by District in the National Congressional Elections 2000
and 2001, Regional Elections 2002, in Peru
R eg10n
.
2000
2001
2002
In d.igenous * s·IZe2
+I - %0
+I - %0
Amazonas
-5
+7
82
80
75
-N s
-4
79
L
Ancash
83
0
79
-5
+3
78
Apurimac
80
s
75
Arequipa
XL
-4
+2
90
88
86
Ayacucho
76
-4
+3
75
M
'1
72
81
-5
'1'1 XL
+6
82
Caiamarca
76
-2
85
L
Callao
84
82
+3
L/XL3
80
+1
Cusco
79
0
'1
80
Huancavelica
-3
+4
77
M
73
76
Huanuco
-5
'1'1 M
75
70
+5
75
L
+1
lea
85
+3
89
86
-2
+2
~
XL
Junin
82
80
82
-3
XL
La Libertad
83
80
+3
83
Lambayeque
XL
-3
+2
87
84
86
Lima
-2
85
83
+3
86**
-4
+7
~'1
M
Loreto
77
73
80
-5
+6
'1'1 s
75
70
Madre de Dios
76
+2
89
Moquegua
-3
s
90
87
-6
+5
81
s
Pasco
82
76
'1
+4
XL
-3
82
86
Piura
85
XL
-1
84
+3
Puno
85
87
+4
81
M
San Martin
81
-4
77
'1
+1
s
Tacna
92
-3
89
90
+4
-3
s
89
Tumbes
88
85
-3
+4
Ucayali
76
73
'1'1 s
77
Average
82.28 -3.2
79.08
3.52
82.52

*indigenous concentration in this district
**The district Lima here means the provincial part of the region, therefore excluding the
city Lima.
2: Districts are categorized according to electorate size: S= 0-200,000 ; M=200,001400,000; L=400,001- 600,000; XL=600,001 and above: based on 2001 national election
data
3.Cusco had 599,712 registered voters, and is therefore less than 300 votes away from the
classification as an Extra-Large District. Thus, I apply both measures Land XL.
'1 estimate based on geographical location
'1'1 estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yanez. Eds.
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades Indigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas.
Lima: BIBLOS S.A.)
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Indigenous identification as
mobilizing factor

Political history (stability)
Relationship high-lowlands

relation to indigenous populations)

Size oflndigenous Population
Urbanization
Capital/center of politics (in

Self-identification of
indigenous population

60-70%
60+%
West-Central, in the Andes

Bolivia
Peasants (highland),
Indigenous (lowland)

Instable
Low conflict after overarching
organization was formed, cocagrowers dominant over lowland
indigenous
Indigenous label has negative
Growing as movements do,
connotation, loss of indigenous indigenous label has stigma but
identification except for Indians seems to become less intense as
in the Amazon, Cholos in cities political influence grows
rediscovering native roots

Instable
Little compromise or
coalescence, neither is
politically influential

Peru
Peasants (highland),
Indigenous (lowland),
Cholos (in pueblos jovenes in
cities)
40-45%
70+%
Removed: on the Coast

Growing as movements do,
indigenous label has stigma but
seems to become less intense as
political influence grows

Relatively Stable
Low conflict after overarching
organization was formed

25-35%
60+%
North-Central

Ecuador
Indigenous (highland and
lowland)

Table 3.5: Comparison of Factors Affecting Indigenous Mobilization in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador

Conclusions
The three preceding chapters have shown that the proportional representation
electoral systems in place for the legislatures in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru seem to have
a negative effect on the formation (in Peru) and further institutionalization and electoral
success (in Bolivia and Ecuador) of indigenous factions. I do not argue that PR systems
overall have a negative effect on indigenous representation, but rather that the specific
characteristics of the PR systems discussed in this analysis may have such an effect. The
mechanics with which the PR systems have been applied in these three countries seem to
have influenced indigenous representation negatively. This suggests that there is indeed
a correlation between the type of electoral system in place and the level of indigenous
representation that is likely to be achieved in the national legislature. The overall
implication is that institutional factors inherent to electoral systems may slow down or
hinder indigenous political organization that could essentially allow for greater
indigenous access to political resources.
Another common argument that has been explored in all three cases is that
indigenous groups have not achieved full cooperation with each other for the "common
good" (even though they have realized a more significant level of collaboration in Bolivia
and Ecuador than in Peru). I suggest in my findings that the failure of the ambitious
leadership of indigenous parties prevents cooperation, at least to an extent. In Bolivia, I
found that the electoral system's encouragement of small party entrance seems to further
encourage leaders to pursue their own goals; in Ecuador the parallel vote seems to
support intra-party competition between candidates, and the DOPV in Peru may promote
individual-focused voter choice rather than one based on party or agenda, thereby
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encouraging the personalistic orientation of leaders. Therefore, as the PR electoral
system seems to encourage and exacerbate the tendencies and opportunities of such
leaders to follow their personal objectives rather than to act for the common indigenous
interest, I argue that the electoral system is in fact a causal factor for the "personalismo"
that has been observed within indigenous leadership structures, which may have
contributed to the slow institutionalization of indigenous factions.
Some may argue that the applicability of the results of this study is somewhat
limited by the fact that indigenous representation was considered mainly at the national
level, rather than probing deeper into the local level where indigenous factions have been
significantly more successful in all three countries. While the lower levels of government
provide a good training ground and the first level of access to the political stage for many
indigenous organizations, I argue that representation in these bodies does not yet ensure
the channeling of the same amount of demands as representation at the national level
would. This argument is based on the fact that decentralization is a relatively new
phenomenon in all three countries. The national government still holds the majority of
decision-making power, as many of the smaller administration units are still fiscally
dependent on the central organ, and therefore lack a considerable amount of autonomy. I
do acknowledge, however, as their roles become more manifested regional and municipal
governments will play a significant role in the future. We can witness the beginnings of
this in Bolivia and Ecuador, where the transfer of responsibilities and resources to local
governments began in 1994 and 1997, respectively, and has advanced further than in
Peru.
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Naturally, there are alternative factors not addressed here that may influence the
level of indigenous representation in the legislature. These may include indigenous
poverty, cultural factors that may inhibit successful participation in the political arena
(for example the traditional social organization into ayllus in Bolivia, as discussed in
Chapter 1), or grass roots and foreign support of indigenous political development
through non-governmental organizations. I do not, however, argue that the findings of
this study are exclusive, but rather that they need to be considered within the "big
picture". The attribution of explanatory power to single variables may be feasible in the
process of developing theory, but has only limited applicability in the real world of policy
formation. It is clear that institutional, social, cultural, and economic factors together
create the environment that determines who will hold political and economic power in a
country.
This thesis makes a contribution to the field of political science in that it
challenges the overly positive image a number of scholars have created in regards to the
inclusion of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes of their countries. It
undermines the overall assumption that proportional representation systems usually foster
the political representation of marginalized or repressed sectors of society, since such a
system can discourage the institutionalization of small factions, subsequently decreasing
their chances for electoral success. Finally, this study adds three cases to the extensive
literature on electoral laws and their effects, therefore providing practical testing grounds
for existing theory.
The main purpose of this analysis is to show that despite apparent electoral
successes of indigenous people's movements that are seeking access to the national
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political stage, the way to representation of their interests is still long. The electoral
system needs to be considered when formulating any policy that is aimed at the inclusion
of marginalized sectors of society into the political process. Such policy may then help
prevent future extra-systemic struggles by peoples who do not feel their interests are
sufficiently represented within the existing political structure.
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